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Preface
"Over the long run, the efficiency of the indiTidual worker
is a minor element in the productivity of the labor force. The most
energetic and skillfial shoemaker, working long hours vath the hand tools
of a century ago, could not remotely approach the productivity of today's
semi-skilled operative, working x^dth the aid of automatic power driven
machinery.
"Whether we increase output per manhour during the next decade
by 18% or by some other percentage—or not at all—vdll not be determined
by 'projecting past trends*. It will be determined, as it has been in
the past, by a multitude of actions and decisions on the part of indi-
viduals, inventors, industrial managers, entrepreneurs, investors,
workers, and consumers. It is this collective decision, conditioned by
their hopes and fears, expressed in the halls of government as well as
in the market place, that will deteimine whether we will continue to
multiply the fruits of the power age.
"What has happened in reality has been not only a vast increase
in the amount and variety of goods available to the population and a
meirked advance in labor productivity, but also a steady expansion in the
number and proportion of shortening of the work week.
J. Frederic Dewhurst, Men and Machinery,
Commercial and Financial Chronicle
Vol. 165, Thursday, May 8, 1947, Page 2.
"It required the thrift and savings of many a person, native
and foreign, to provide the funds which built our great transportation
system, our large steel industry, our giant oil plant, our magnificlent
farms, industrial mining, and business structure. It took thrift and
savings, together with indomitable courage and eneigy, to develop our
vast natural resources. It took thrift and savings, together with
tremendous character and vision, to make our nation what it is today.
And it will take thrift and savings, together with constant ingenuity
and stamina, to conserve our remaining resources to enable us to continue
to be a great nation."
John W. Snyder, Secretary of the Treasury.

Introduction
America operating under a capitalist economy has b\iLlt up a
productive capacity wliich dwarfs tliat of the rest of the world. That
is so because in the past Anerica has presented opportxmlties for the
growth of capital, through the ability and willingness of the investor
to take a risk, unparalleled by the rest of the world. Production, the
only method by which our standard of living may be improved, increases
only as the quantity and q^uality of tools available for production
increases, and these are increased only through the accumulation of
capital.
Fewer people understand this simple example of cause and effect
than we might suppose. Capital, regardless of popular belief, does not
automatically reproduce itself in some mysterious way. The growth of
capital requires that people deny thaaselves immediate satisfactions and
desires in order to save and invest in the business enterprises of the
nation in the expectation that future returns on their capital investment
will justify present sacrifices. The ability of business to raise new
capital, particularly ownership or risk capital for replacement and
maintenance of old machines, for new productive enterprise, and for
bettement of existing establishments depends upon the existence of
reasonable inducements, as well as upon the ability of people to risk
their savings and make investments which will increase the means of
production.
A year ago there were increasing signs that the supply of funds
available for investment was no longer as plentiful as it had been.
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Immediately after the successfTil conclusion of World ViTar II, and for some
months thereafter, ample investment money appeared to be available for
employment. Despite the lowest interest rates in our histoiy, financing
of eveiy kind was easy, and industry entering upon a period of postwar
expansion took fullest advantage of this opportunity. Today, necessary
industrial expansion is by no means completed, and the need for capital,
particularly ownership or risk capital, continues unabated, if not
aggravated, by the failure of the cycle which occurred after the First
World War to repeat itself. Business had expected a brief period of
prosperity followed by a sharp recession as in 1921. The failure of this
recession to materialize had led to the need for expansion plans to be
themselves expanded at the very time that capital has became more difficult
to obtain.
After the war, industry commences to draw heavily on its
reserves and surplus earnings for reconversion and for postwar expansion.
It then looked to its nonnal source of capital—the securities market.
For a period of several months all appeared well. Investors were eager
to absorb new security issues and diiring 1945 and 1946 heavy offerings of
the risk capital type were accepted without difficulty. Since then, how-
ever, the financial world has became increasingly aware of considerable
reluctance on the part of individual investors to invest their savings
directly in the securities of provate enterprise. Common stock issues,
which represent the ownership eq\iity, have become more and more difficult
to sell. Even the bond markets and the market for preferred stocks have
developed a "sticky" tendency, rendering the market for junior securities
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even more sluggish. From time to time the market for new issues has siiffered
periods of congestion and new stock financing has remained at the com-
paratively low levels prevailing after the substantial drop in prices of
outstanding new issues in the summer and fall of 1946. More and more
industry seeking new capital has been forced to resort to the insti-
tutional market, and is the opinion of many, become too dependent on that
source (l). Obviously, if larger scale new financing is to take place
and bank accomodations be forthcoming, industry must have access to an
abundance of ownership or risk capital.
The postwar boom accompanied by sixty million jobs and near
capacity operation was due to the expansion program embarked on by industry.
It is the one factor which not only eliminated the possibility of wide-
spread unemployment after the war but has kept this nation one step ahead
of ruinous inflation such as has developed in postwar Japan, or was seen
in Geimany after World War I. Plants were expanded and modernized, new
equipment was installed and larger inventories carried. Expenditures in
1947 for such purposes totaled 26 1/2 Billion—the equivalent of more than
one-half the national income in one of the depression years.
This capital came from the following sources:
Prom accumulated coiporate profits 15 1/4 Billion
From bank loans, bond, and other
forms of new indebtedness 10 Billion
(1) In 1947, life insurance companies and banks took 75^ of new security
issues and practically all in 1946.
Milliken, Eugene, Taxes and Government Spending,
Commercial and Financial Chronicle, Vol. 167, Thursday,
March 11, 1948, Page 26.
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YrorcL the sale of stock 1 l/4 Billion
Of the small amoTint obtained from the sale of stock, only one-half
represented the sale of conmion stock, the means of obtainiiig ownership
capital. This means that only about 2 per cent of industrial capital
expenditures during 1947 were provided for by risk or ownership capital.
This trend has been continued into and throiigh 1948. Common
and preferred stock issues are providing an even smaller proportion of
necessary capital requirements. The "Monthly Letter" for Novanber of the
National City Bank of New York cites compilations by the "Commercial and
Pinancial Chronicle" which show that corporations and state and local
governments together raised $6.3 Billion new funds through new security
issues in the first nine laonths of 1948 compared with $4.7 Billion in the
corresponding period of 1947. 1948 is expected to top the $7 Billion in
funds raised through the new security market in 1947. The significant
fact is that the vast bulk of these new issues are bonds; stock issues
accoTjnt for one one-ninth of the new issues total. In the first quarter
of 1948, the market absorbed |2.5 Billion of new money financing, and 10
per cent of this figure was raised from the sale of equities. This is the
lai^est quantity total of new money financing since the third quarter of
1929. But in that quarter of 1929, 76 per cent of all funds raised were
raised by equity financing. Evea as recently as 1945, 52 per cent of
all funds were raised by equity financing. In 1946, the percentage fell
to 29 per cent; and in 1947 27 per cent (l).
(1) Truslow, Francis A,, How Can we Stimulate Venture Capital?,
Dun*s Review
, July, 1948, Page 17.
.0
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This meeins that in 1947, 73 per cent of all new capital raised was in the
fom of bonds and notes (l). The simple conclusion to be drawn from
these figures in that equity capital—risk capital—cannot be raised, so
business has turned more and more to debt financing to obtain the capital
it must have.
In the inflationary present era when plant and equipment and
investing costs have risen from two to three times prewar prices, large
amounts of capital are needed merely to maintain the present volume of
business. Industry cannot continue to finance improvements out of past
profits for they are now almost entirely committed. Higher costs are narrow-
ing the profit margin and which profits stand at record dollar heights,
corporate profits after taxes considered in relation to total income
(estimated at 240 Billion in 1948 as against 80 Billion in 1929) are less
than in 1929 (9.1 per cent as against 9.6 per cent in 1929) and dividends
returned to investors are exactly one-half the percentage of the national
income returned to stockholders in 1929 (2), (3.3 per cent as against
6.6 per cent in 1929) indicating the extent to which management has been
forced to retain profits in the business to meet operating and exptmsion costs
(1) It is important to note also that the types of business v;hich found
it possible to raise outside capital for expansion in 1947 were
public utilities and telephone companies where there is comparatively
little risk involved. These companies accounted for more than one-
half of the new investment in 1947. The more risky manufacturing
business accounted for a much snail er proportion of the total in
1947 than was customary in earlier years.
(2) National Income by Distributive Shares, Monthly Letter, National City
Bank of New York
,
Novanber, 1948, Page 127.
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in spite of the desire to furnish inducement for new capital investment.
Depreciation rates insufficient to replace existing plant and equipment
complicate the problem and eat into profits for money retained in the
business under depreciation allowed by the present tax law is not
sufficient to accomplish the objective of depreciation.
This business unable to replace and expand out of profits and
unable to obtain ownership funds has turned more and more to debt
securities, as shovm above, with the inevitable result of an upset in
balance between ownership and debt capital in the capital structure.
Already the limits to safe and sound capitalization by debt are in sight.
Business is mindful of what happened in the railroad industry as a result
of entering the depression period with a hea"vy debt load; the resulting
fixed charges absorbed depression earnings and forced many roads into
bankruptcy. Business does not wish to anulate the railroads in the
event of a long overdue "correction" in business conditions, but unless
common stock piirchaser can be aroused from his apathy, a sudden break
in prosperity could well find industry with an excessive debt burden.
It is obvious that if the national standard of living is to be
raised or even maintained at present levels, if we are to continue to
keep one step ahead of inflation, the nation* s productive facilities
must continue to be improved and expanded. The American people present
a vast actual and potential market today. There is anrple demand on the
basis of population increase alone to absorb the products of an enlarged
national plant (l) . Why then has a drought developed in the supply of
(1) Slichter, Sumner H. , Price Trends and Capital Demand and Supply,
Comercial and Financial Chronicle , Vol. 168, Thursday,
September 30, 1948, P. 30.
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risk capital since 1946?
In the past, America has presented opportimities for the growth
of capital unparalleled hy the rest of the world. What is the situation
now? Why should the investor in CGmtnon stocks become unwilling in the
space of only two years to risk his money when apparently the times are
prosperous and earnings are high (l). Why are incentives to invest so
lacking that the economist, Sumner Slichter, has estimated the shortage
of capital in the country today to be as high as $75 billions ( 2)
.
The President of the Westinghouse Electric Corporation recently
used his own corporation as an example to show the inducement (or rather,
lack of it) now being offered the investor. In 1947, Westinghouse paid
common dividends of $1.25 a share. In order to pay that $1.25, the
corporation first had to pay federal and state income taxes totaling 85
cents a share. The Westinghouse stockholders then paid surtax rates
ranging from 19 per cent to 85 per cent. In the case of the stockholder
•whose income taxes on his dividend were in the 50 per cent bracket, a
total of $1.45 was paid to the tax collector, the stockholder retaining
only 62 per cent out on original $2.10. At the 1947 average stock exchange
prices that amount constituted a net cash return of a little more than
2 per cent. And state andlocal government had yet to take its share.
(1) The Treasury Department states that as of November, 1948, liquid
assets in the hands of individuals represented by government bonds,
under bank deposits and ciirrency amount to "501 billion; the figure
was only $50 billion, November of 1941.
(2) The purchase of eq[\iities would appear favorable to investors v/hen
ratios of price to earnings are as low as they are today.
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This illustrates the fiction behind the apparently high yields of caramon
stock and ezplains why stock of highly regarded companies have sold at
five to eight times their earnings. Why shouldn*t the investor prefer
to put his money into tax exempt municipals, savings accounts, or
insurance?
Turning from cash retum to seciirity of investment, the
Westinghouse President agrees that Westinghouse profits are high in teims
of dollars, but represent a return of less than 7 per cent on sales.
Further although 1947 sales were five times those of 1928, profits were
only three times as large. The coniparison in 1948 is even less
favorable. The conclusion is inevitable that by any reasonable standard
of security of investment, of insurance against the larger risks taken
of provision against lean years, Yfestinghouseprofits are too low rather
than too high.
Westinghouse req.uires at least 75 per ceat more working
capital to operate now at the same physical volume as in 1941. It costs
more than twice as much to build and equip as it did before the war.
Too low depreciation allowances increase the strain on profits. Break-
even points for nearly all companies have reached aJLL time high; the
Westinghouse break-even point now is more than three times what it was
in 1940. Westinghouse, like many other corporations, has invested most
of its profits and surplus in plants and inventories, and has boirrowed
la^ge sums which must be repaid from future profits or from investment
by the owners of "hard to get, take a chance" risk capital.
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This ezample has been selected as typical of what business
leaders, economists, and manbers of regulatory commissions are stating
in the leading financial journals and publications. Instead of the
President of Westinghouse, the fears of a member of a public utilities
commission could have been quoted as he views with alam the tendency
of the oil pipe line ccmpanies to accomplish necessary financing by
an xmusually large amount of debt capital, even for so stable a field
more and more of those responsible for the well-being of the national
economy are recognizing that more risk capital is needed than is now
available to approach industrial goals of higher production and nurture
the individual business or partnership into a mighty industry.
The specific raaedy proposed in the Westinghouse case is the
amendment of tax laws to abolish double taxation of dividends and erect
a more equitable tax structure. Other men of importance in a position
to be intimately acq\iainted with this problem suggest other remedies
and point out further determents to an increased flow of risk capital
into industry. Joseph Dodge, President of the American Banking
Association, has attacked the inconsistency of promoting easy credit on
one hand through government guarantees and the like, and proposing on the
other hand restrictions and controls of private credit. He favors
abolition of this "double standard" and a more equitable tax structure.
P.ichard W. Courts, speaking for the Investment Bankers Association,
attributes the shortage of risk capital to capital gains taxes and high
income taxes and foresees government ownership of American industry imless
relief is obtained. Since the problem is of recent origin and has become
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severe only within the past two years, nearly all of the comment to be
fOTind on the problem appears in the leading financial periodicals, and
financial pages of the leading newspapers. Textbooks do little more
than recognize the need for a proper proportion betv/een debt and owner-
ship capital. The only work specifically devoted to risk capital and
its problons, a pamphlet published in 1946, recognized that -American
industry woiild require large amounts of risk capital in the future and
that business would sell larger amounts of risk capital from external
sources, "if favorable Government and tax policies prevail" (l).
Our problem has aris^ beca\ise of the "if". Favorable
Government and tax policies have not prevailed.
TD Bogen, Jules I., The Market For Risk Capital , iimerican Enterprise
Association, New York, August, 1946.
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A. What It Is
Various degrees of risk attach to Investment in any industry.
The investor who puts his money into gilt-edged bonds may awake one
morning to find that a wholesale business upheaval such as the "Great
Crash of 1929" has rendered the bonds worthless and the business
bankrupt. The investor who saved something from the 1929 catastrophe
may have decided to play safe thereafter and place his money in govern-
ment bonds—the last word in safety. Today, that same investor is
receiving a steady Income from those bonds, but inflation has rendered
that income Ineffective so far as maintaining the standard of living which
that same income would have provided in 1939. Did not that investor take
an economic risk vfhen the dollar return from his safe investment has only
half the purchasing power which it did in 1939? Do not insurance
companies and banks, which are largely prohibited from acquiring stock
holdings and confine their purchases to bonds in order to saf^uard the
lai^e body of policyholders and depositors, take a risk when business is
overburdened with debt as a result of selling only bonds, and heavy fized
charges wipe out earnings and lead to bankruptcy? This is a practical
Illustration of the statanent that various degrees of risk attach to
investment in any industry.
However, regardless of the economic conceptions of risk brought
out in the preceding paragraph, the legal concept which is generally
accepted in the financial field is that those who put their money into
bonds, and bond creditors, are p^tected by provision of law. A debtor
—
creditor relationship obtains and default by the debtor leaves method of
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recourse such as foreclosure of mortgage, etc. (The legal concept, of
course, fails to take into account the position of insurance companies
and banks, having foreclosed industrial and personal property at a time
T^en no market exists, as was true in the last depression.)
On the other hand
,
the purchasers of stock, even in the well-
established concern, run a lai^e degree of risk due to the ivide fluctu-
ation in earnings, especially of common stock. The tem "risk capital"
which is often used synonymously with venture or equity capital refers
specifically to capital which has been Invested in common stock; the
preferred stockholder's position of priority is sometimes well protected
as in strong corporations, and he may not incur an equivalent risk.
The common stockholder, considered in law "the residual legatee"
is the first to be affected by a decline in earnings and the last to be
considered in the dissolution or bankruptcy of an enterprise. The
corporation endeavors, first, to pay the fixed charges on bonds payable,
second, to pay the prescribed dividends on the preferred stock and, third,
after retention of necessary amoimts in the business, the coranion stock-
holder may receive a dividend. Thus the common stockholder (or owner in
the unincorporated enterprise) takes the ultimate risk, and the ownership
capital provided by this class of investor has increasingly been referred
to as risk capital. However, it is generally agreed that lenders to weak
or unseasoned business may likewise be said to provide risk or venture
capital.
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B> Role of Risk Capital
The "Wise business manager exercises care to balance borrov^ed
funds witli equity capital to the greatest extent possible under existing
market conditions. The higher the proportion of ovmership capital in the
business, the lower the interest chaises and the less the pressure from
outside interests for a fixed rate of return and repayment on specified
dates. Especially necessary is risk capital to new unseasoned enter-
prise, and the risk is increased if the industry in which the enterprise
has located is (a) already overcrowded, or (b) a recent development the
future of which is clouded and unpredictable. As example of the
necessity of risk capital, we may refer to the experience of the American
railroads which suffered heavily from bankruptcies in the 1930* s due to
excessive reliance on borrowing to obtain addition capital.
Risk capital, according to Jules I. Bogen's survey of the
market for risk capital, (l) plays three major roles in the conduct of
a healthy dynamic economy. These are:
1. To finance the development of new industries where
the risks are great and iinavoidable. A familiar
example of this is the air transport industry in v;hich
hundreds of millions of capital have already been
invested and at this present moment, requires many
millions more, before stabilization and a satisfactoiy
earning power may be established.
2. To finance new enterprises in older industries—unless
p.ew enterprise is enabled to enter established fields,
there is no assurance that a healthy degree of compe-
tition will be maintained.
IT) Bog en, Jules I., "The Market for Risk Capital" , American Enterprise
Association, New York, 1946.
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Venture capital at reasonable teims readily-
available is a req\iisite to new promotions.
Such new exterprise is often responsible for
major tectmological improvements which renew
the dynamic character of all the enterprises within
the industry.
5» To finance expansion of older enterprises. This
expansion may involve new products, improved
processes, or merely increased capacity for
established products.
The "economic maturity" concept recently popular has been proved
implicity fallacious in the opinion of Jules Bogen and other experienced
observers of the financial scene. He states: (l)
"It was once popular to speak about the * passing of the
frontier* and the attainment of * economic maturity* by the
United States. We have had ample opportunity to observe the
fallacy implicit in these concepts. The fact of the matter
is that frontiers exist in every industry and enterprise,
old or new. A New England farmer who applies the latest
methods of scientific agriculture to his faim is just as
much a pioneer on the economic frontier as was the new settler
on the western prairies two generations ago. In each case,
capital, labor, and brains are put to work in a new way to
produce more plentifully or more cheaply the products people
want."
Risk capital then is necessary to finance the nation's economic
frontiers in all directions, quantitatively and qualitatively. Only if
risk capital is obtainable in adequate volume at moderate cost, can
business expand without injury to credit or loss of flexibility to its
financial structure. An. adequate flow of venture capital into enterprise
will make it unnecessary to tvim to government quarantees, government
subsidies, government loans, and government spending in order to prevent
widespread unemployment.
(l) Bogen, Jules I., "The Market for Ri sk Capital"
. American Enterprise
Association, New York, 1946.
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C» Danand for Risk Capital
The demand for risk capital depends on the willingness of
businessmen to initiate new enterprises and expand existing facilities.
Risk* incurred by the investment of additional capital and under-
standably profits must appear to be in prospect, to constitute an
attractive situation for the businessman. Generally, the more profitable
appearing the enterprise, the readier the businessman will xmdertake and
atteanpt to finance projects involving risk. Government policy which
reassures the businessman as to Ms ability to operate at a profit in the
fut\ire increases and strengthens the demand for risk capital.
During the thirties, there was little demand for capital due to
the drastic contraction of production after the 1929 crash. It was
purely a tanporaiy condition and consistent with the industrial pattern
during a depression, for neither industry nor investors had courage to
push capital plans aggressively. After 1939 as industrial output was
stepped up, the demand for capital vms renev/ed vath a large part of that
demand satisfied by government through the letting of stupendous defense
and war contracts. At the peak of the v^ar effort in 1944, 175 billions
had been let in contracts to 18,539 firms. Because so large a part of that
demand was satisfied by government, interest rates fell to an all time
low—business did not need to borrow, much less push the sale of equity
securities. As a result, during the war investors placed their money in
government bonds or in bank accoxmts.
With the return of peace, industry sought larger amounts of
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risk capital to finance reconversion and expansion of plant, equipment
and inventories. At first, investors were eager to absorb new security-
issues and during 1945 and 1946, heavy offerings of the risk capital type
were accepted without difficulty. Since then, it has become more and
more difficult to sell issues representing risk capital.
Because times are good, it is commonly and fallaciously thoiaght
that business can get all the funds it wants. The facts show this is not
true. The sluggish action of the stock market is clear indication
especially over the last few months that stocks are not attractive. The
average yield on new sec\irities has been increasing for some time, and the
spread between rates paid on issues involving greater risk than the gilt-
edge type is now substantially greater than a year or so ago. This means
that despite the surface prosperity, sufficient individuals are not
xvilling today to risk their capital in the more venturesome forms of
enterprise.
Business in 1947 and 1948 found that in order to obtain funds
for even minimum replacement needs, a much larger portion of its profits
than customary had to be retedned. Not only was there a decline of
common stock issues in relation to debt issues, but actual money volume
also declined, demonstrating a shift of investors away from the risk-
taking foim of security and a shortage of risktakers.
This apparent drying up of the supply of risk capital comes at
a time when danand is near its all-time high. In 1947 American business
required an overall amoimt of 25 Billions. In 1948, a similar amount was
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necessary. It is estimated that over the next five years, capital needs
of industry will equal 50 Billion dollars. The First National Bank of
Boston in July, 1948, set a requirement of 75 Billion. Thus, demand
continues high; let us now consider the factors affecting the supply of
risk capital.
D. Supply of Risk Capital
As will he shotm in a later section, a large part of the supply
of risk capital is obtained from internal sources such as that capital set
aside by depreciation provisions, imdistributed profits not paid out of
dividends, and funds obtained by sale of assets no longer needed in the
business. External sources consist of commercial bank loans, security
issues, government lending agencies, etc.
The general trend in the taxation of corporations up to the
present period has been to limit the supply of risk capital obtainable
from within the business. The government in setting restrictions on the
amount of depreciation that could be taken by business, establishing high
corporate income tax rates—at present 38 per cent
—
, and imposing in
1936 the undistributed p3X)fits tax, has definitely accomplished such
limitation. Section 102 of the Internal Revenue Act imposes an additional
tax upon "unreasonable" accumulations of surplus, (l). This section was
not enforced during the war, no doubt due to recognition of the Bureau
(1) Section 102 of the Internal Revenue Code provides for a penalty tax
of 27^- per cent on the first 100,000 of net income found to have been
improperly retained for the p\irpose of enabling stockholders to avoid
surtaxes, and of 3&|- per cent on all such net income in excess of
|100,000.
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of Internal Revenue that it -would be difficult to detexmine what woiild
be "imreasonable" under the abnormal wartime conditions. Some
economists today advocate payment of this levy rather than to lower
funds retained in the business when a bust might appear at any time. An
excess profits tax is on the horizon and would make further inroads on
internal financing.
However, only established concerns that can depend on
depreciation and other reserves can obtain risk capital internally and
even then only acquire a fraction of their needs. Risk capital can be
obtained externally through loans or issue of preferred and coramon shares.
Borrowing is a less desirable method, but sometimes business has no other
source.
Commereial banks in the past provided considerable risk capital
to business in the form of loans. Since the difficulties of 1931-1933,
most banks are unwilling to loan when there is a considerable degree of
risk involved. Some bank credit groups have been set up in various
cities to lend out of a pool of bond funds to aaall and medium sized
business in order to provide some risk capital on a loan basis.
The relative importance of new investment fimds and of retained
income as sources of risk capital expansion are indicated in the follow-
ing table, which tabulates the new issues of capital stock, common and
preferred, and the amount of income retained by corporations for the
years 1929-1941.
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TABLE I
New Capital Stock Issues and Income Retained
by Corporations, 1929-1942
(Millions of Dollars)
Calender New Income Returned
Year Stock Issues All Corporations
CoraiJion and Preferred Corporations vd-th. net
Income
1929 $ 6,089 $ 2,320 t 5,238
1930 1,545 4,255 990
1931 311 7,327 481
1932 20 8,001 132
1933 120 4,481 771
1934 35 2,510 965
1935 69 1,253 1,468
1936 368 800 1,356
1937 408 960 1,263
1938 67 1,742 1,086
1939 97 199 2,234
1940 135 711 2,970
1941 173 2,806 4,630
Total 9,137 25,293 23,584
a. Income retained is compiled net profit less taxes and cash dividends.
It therefore includes tax exesarpt interest and dividends received*
Source: A Tax Program For a Solvent -America by the Committee on Postwar
Tax Policy. The Ronald Press Company, New York, 1945, Page 73.
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The above record indicates that new stock issues played a minor
role in the financing of corporate expansion during the years covered by
this table. There ks.s a steady expansion of the volume of new issues
to 1929, and on balance, in the same years, income retained by the
prosperous exceeded by substantial margins the losses sustained by other
co3rporations. The income retained by the net income corporations from
1925 to 1929 was far greater in the aggregate than the total of new stock
issues for that period.
Beginning vd.th 1930, corporations as a whole entered a definite
period in which losses greatly exceeded profits. Under these conditions
there was little reason to seek nevi capital funds, particularly if the
risk type. In each of the depression years, some corporations were able
to avoid deficits, but the aggregate income retained remained at a com-
paratively low level until 1941 when the defense and war programs caused
funds to be provided by the government.

II « Net'; Capital Requirements
The Department of Comrrerce has estimated that "gross capital
foimation" amounted to $17,600,000,000 in 1929 and to $19,000,000,000 in
1941. Even in the depression year 1932—the very trough of the
depression
—
private gross capital formation aggregated $2.2 billion. A
Twentieth Century Fund study estimated in 1946 that postwar industrial
e23)enditures would exceed $280 billion over the next fifteen year,
averaging out or at the rate of approximately $18 billion per postwar
year (1).
The Survey of Cxarrent Business for April, 1948, announces that
the actual outlays for new plant and equipment in 1947 were 16.2 billion
of dollars and estimated an expenditure for 1948 of an amount 15 per
cent above that figure or $18.7 billion. The estimate for the full year
1948 vras obtained as part of the regiilar quarterly survey of business
outlays for new producers capital conducted jointly by the office by
Business Economics and the Securities and Exchange Commission. The
following chart affords a breakdown of these figures.
(i) Aggregate investment of new capital in comrerce and industry,
transportation, urban developments and rural developments.
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TABLE II
Expenditures on New Plant and Equipment by United States Business
1945—1948
(Millions of Dollars)
Industry G-roup 1945 1946 1947 1948
Man\ifact\iring |3,210 $5,910 $7,460 $7,760
Mining 440 560 690 690
Railroads 550 570 920 1,620
Other Transportation 320 660 800 780
Electric and G-as Utilities 630 1,040 1,900 2,300
And Miscellaneous 1,480 3,300 4,430 5,500
Total 6,630 12,040 16,200 18,700
1. Excluding Agriculture
2. Estimated
Source: Adapted from United States Department of Commerce, Current and
Prospective Plant and Equipment Expenditures, Survey of
Ciirrent Business . Vol. 28, April, 1948, P. 12.
The McGraw-Hill Publishing Company survey of capital expendi-
tures completed in February of 1948 showed a figure of 16.1 billion
spent on new plant and equipment in 1947 (as compared vdth 16.2 billion
figure of the Department of Commerce) and estimated an expenditure in
1946 of not much less than that amount—15.8 billion.
Among the conclusions made from the survey was the follovdng:
1. Industry's postwar expansion program is not yet complete,
despite the high expenditures since the war. A weighted
average of manufacturing company* s shoi/s their programs
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were only 64 per cent finished at the end of 1947,
By the end of 1948, according to this survey,
manufacturing executives expect to bring this up
to 85 per cent, indicating on the basis of expansion
needs for nev; capital alone, the demand for capital
will continue unabated for some time.
2. Aggregate figxires can be deceptive—what applies to
industry as a whole may not apply to particular lines,
and will not apply to every producer in every line.
A breakdown of overall capital expenditures into
separate industries shows much variations. For some
lines, the postwar expansion program has been
relatively small, although for business as a whole,
it has been enormous. Some industries are nearly
through ivith their additions to plant and equipment,
others are just getting started. In the months ahead.
Industries which have nearly completed their plans
will cut back spending. Their reduced capital needs
will not reduce the total need, for other companies
will still have a larger part of their programs to
finish.
For example, automobile manufacturers have already installed
71 per cent of new plant and equipment called for in the postwar programs.
By the end of 1948, they expect to be 97 per cent finished.
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Machinery products are so far along that they vdll reduce
eacpenditures 30-50 per cent in 1948 with deeper cuts in prospect for 1949.
The oil companies are at the other extreme with 43 per cent of
their programs now completed and only 75 per cent finished by the end of
1948. 25 per cent of these companies state they will spend more in 1949
than in 1948.
In size of programs, the chonical companies top the list of
manufacturing industries. They are like the oil companies in the midst
of a long tem growth trend which should continue after industries have
adjusted their structTires to the postwar situation. Chemical company
expenditures totaled 1.4 billion for new plant and equipment in 1947, and
are expected to reach that approximate figure in 1948. Their program at
the end of 1947 was only 55 per cent finished.
These statistics show that American industry requires huge
amounts of new capital to maintain and expand its capacity and to increse
its efficiency. Of course, as shovm above, the amount of nevj capital
absorbed by individual enterprises will vary greatly. In general, newer
industry will constantly absorb capital at a higher rate but older and
established industries will require considerable amoimts for modernization
and expansion.
A. Financing Postwar Needs
In general, expansion in business assets diiring periods of rising
business activity is financed from three broad sources:
1. Depreciation allowances for replacing plant and eqiiipment.
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2. Retained profits after divident payments—internal
financing
.
5. External financing.
Public utilities and railroad industries have relied more on
external financing tlian manufacturing and mining industries. Manufacturers
have found funds derived from internal sources to be more important
—
retained profits and depreciation allowances. . The general proportions of
these sources of financing do not differ greatly among the three broad
industrial groups.
D-uring the period follomng the war, especially in the case of
war industries, f\inds from internal sources were supplemented by certain
transitional adjustments. These adjustments wich consisted of tax
benefits (due to recomputation of amortization deductions (l) occurred
mainly in 1945 and had the effect of creating tax overpayments during the
war years; thereby resulting in tax credits. These tax credits applied
to returns of postwar years reduced tax payments durivj^ these years and
internal funds were correspondingly greater. These adjustments, of course,
aided in financing post-vra.r needs.
Another method utilized by business in adjusting from vrartime
business to a peacetiin.e program is the liquidation of certain of the assets
b\iilt up during the war, for example, government obligations. Capital
thus realized was used to reduce wartime liabilities and pay increased
(1) In order to promote the construction of facilities for war needs, the
second revenue act, 1940, provided that new plants which were certified
as necessary by the war procurement services could be amortized for
tax purposes over a sixty-month period.
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operating cost v.ltli the expectation that peacetirae productivity would
replace the govenment bonds v.dth other assets, cash, accounts receivable.
Differences in the time of receipts and disbursements probably resulted
in temporaiy drainage of fimds for some companies, increased by current
outlays necessary to rebuild inventories, renovate and replace plant and
equipment re-establishing peacetime markets, and extending customer
credit. In the majority of cases, these activities, peculiar to the
reconversion period were accompanied by postv/ar expansion programs.
These tv/o methods of internal financing were accompanied by
withholdings from corporate earnings. The Monthly Letter of the National
City Bank of New York for November, 1948, shows that for the first nine
months of that year, the combined net income after taxes of 400 companies
totaled 2,780 million, compared with 2,122 million in the same period of
1947, an increase of 31 per cent. There were particularly substantial
increases in sales and earnings in the follov/ing groups: petroleum
products, chemicals, textiles, building materials, iron and steel, auto-
mobiles and parts, electrial and radio equipment and various other metal
products. However, while corporate earnings in 1948 have in dollar
volume increased largely over both 1929 and 1948, the proportionate share
of the total national income is actually lower than in 1929. Thus,
business managers were in many instances faced vdth the prospect of hold-
ing dovm. dividend payments (and thus lowering the real income of investors)
in order to provide dollars for higher operating costs and plant and
equipment expansion.
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In addition to these internal sources, there has been consider-
able need for external financing by business. Some funds v;ere used
merely for interim purposes, but, the bulk of the fimds so raised have
been used for more or less peimanent additions to vx)rking capital and
long-tem assets. It was expected that both banks and security markets
•would share in providiDg the funds, with the proportions coming from each
depending partly on the terms and conditions granted. It was not expect-
ed, however, that the proportion of debt to equity financing wo\ild be so
heavy or that high grade stocks v/ould sell at prices only five or six
times their earnings. This result, even in the comparatively stable
utility field, has found businesses such as the oil pipeline companies
under a heavy biirden of debt financing. Equity financing has steadily
decreased in importance. Notes and bonds represented 2/3 of all
securities in 1947, as against a little more than 1/3 in 1946; they are
expected to represent almost 3/4 in 1948.
B. Internal Soiirces of Cjstpital
Internal sources of capital includes:
1. Depreciation, depletion, and related reserves set up
from earnings.
2. Undistributed profits not paid out as dividends.
3. Funds realized from liquidation of assets no longer
required in the business.
In 1947, in addition to the substantial capital outlays changed
to current account, corporations other than banks and insurance companies,
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expended over 14.5 billion dollars on plant and equipment, close to
7 billion on enlarging their inventories and added 5 billion to their
trade receivables. This aggregate of 26.5 billion dollars—the highest
in record—was financed by 10 billion of retained profits, 4.5 billion of
depreciation charges, 4 billion of net receivable capital issues and
3.5 billion of bank loans (including mortgages), as well as by a billion
dollars increase in trade payable, a 3 billion increase in income tax
liabilities and other payables, and 500 million dollar reduction in
liquid assets. This, funds available from current operations—that is,
throTjgh retained profits and depreciation charges—were approximately
twice as large as those obtained from external sources through security
or bank loans (l).
Capital from internal sources has al\\'ays been of major importance
in aiding the development of i^erican industry. It is hard to justify the
statement that reliance of industry upon reinvestment of reserves and
earnings is typical only of a mature economy. Throtighout the nineteenth
century
—
period of their most rapid development—manufactxiring enter-
prises relied heavily on funds from internal soxirces to finance new
development, which railroads and public utilities relied mainly on
external soiirces for requisite capital.
As mentioned before, the growing treand in corporate taxation
has been to limit the supply of risk capital that could be obtained within
(T) Friend, Irwin, Business Financing in the Postwar Period, Survey of
Current Business . Vol. 28, March, 1948, Page 11.
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the business. If business is to continue to drav/ on this important
source, greater recognition of its vital importance is necessary. Since
1934 the Treasury has exercised its powers to affect such reinvestment
adversely. Depreciation and depletion deductions by business have been
sharply limited. Excessive corporation income taxation accompanied by
indiscriminate application of the Treasury of such measures as Section
102 of the Internal Revenue Act, which levies a penalty tax on
"unreasonable" accumulations of surplus, would definitely discourage and
curtail business savings.
Prior to amendment of the Revenue Act in 1934, the taxp^er was
allowed considerable freedom in setting depreciation rates for fixed
assets. Since amendment of the Act placed specific responsibility upon
the taxpayer to justify the reasonableness of the depreciation rates used
by him, the Treasury has followed a much sterner policy. A pamphlet has
been published by the Treasury setting forth approved rates for certain
classes of assets and definitely limiting allowances.
It follovrs that such a policy discourages nev/ capital investment
and the point has been developed by Lewis E. Kimmel in Depreciation
Policy and Postwar Expansion . Mr. Kimmel feels the most important con-
sequence of the stricter policy was that it tended to have an adverse
effect on capital expansion then regarded as essential. "Liberal
depreciation allowances for tax purposes reduce the risk; conversely
reduced allowances mean increased risk." Moreover, the more venturesome
the undertaking, the more important a reasonably liberal depreciation
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policy becomes. To the extent that the change to a stricter policy
resulted in lower rates of depreciation, the investment of risk capital
was affected adversely (l).
The Treasury policies in regard to depreciation and depletion
deductions from taxable income and the reinvestment of corporate earn-
ings become of greater importance when one considers the Department of
Commerce reports on the impcrtence of funds derived from internal
sources in the financing of business capital outlays. In 1929 at the
peak of prosperity, they exceeded 10 billion. In the five years, 1936
to 1940, they averaged 7.5 billion per year. The record expenditures
of 1947 were financed by 10 billions of retained profits and 4.5 billion
of depreciation charges.
In some industries, funds derived from internal sources provide
most of the capital required for expansion purposes by established
businesses. Joseph E. Pogue and Frederick G. Coqueron of the Chase
National Bank made a study of how three large petroleum companies
financed their capital needs and discovered that their capital expendi-
tures aggregated 8 billions from 1934 to 1944 and their working capital
expanded by 682 million. 5.9 billions of this amount came from depletion,
depreciation, amortization and retiranent reserves, 671 million came out
of other non-cash charges against income, and 1.971 millions out of
retained net income. Only 294 million had to be obtained from external
sources by these companies.
(l) Kimmel , Lewis E.
,
Depreciation Policy and Postwar Expansion ,
Brookings Institue, V/ashington, D.C., 1946.
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However, many other industries must look to external sources
for funds to finance their capital expenditures. Particularly is this
true in newer industry such as the airlines which since the end of the
war have poured many millions into expansion and must still increase
their investment to maintain their present systems. Older industries,
especially new and smaller concerns that can derive little or no money
for expansion from internal sources, find this to be true also.
Furtheianore, any industry at one period in its history may find
the funds derived from internal sources quite adequate to their needs,
but at other periods, capital needs may far outrun the funds provided
by this source. Particularly was this true at the outbreak of the
Second World War. Large investments in new plants vrere made by the
Federal Government to secure needed production of sjmthetic rubber and
other critical materials. A technological development such as the
production of sjmthetic mbber might have led to external financing in
a larger scale had its production occurred in peacetime.
C. External Sources of Capital
The more important of the external sources of capital are:
1. Security issues through public offerings, private
placement, and issuance of rights convertible into
securities.
2. ConHiiercial banks from which short or intermediate loans
are generally obtained. Business also finds that the
tem lending by banks and insurance companies make
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possible installment borrovdng of considerable sums.
Bank credit groups are found in a number of cities
which provide loans to small and medium sized enter-
prises that an individual bank would hesitate to
make because of legal limitations or unfamilisr*ity
with the type of loan desired.
3. Sales finance Factoring, and other concerns which
specialize in the conversion of accounts receivable
into cash.
4. Government lending agencies, such as the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation and the Export-Import Bank. Such
agencies are of most importance at periods when other
sources of funds have dried up as in the depression
years.
Despite the greatly increased amount of internal (l) financing
done since the war, it is still necessary for business to draw on outside
sources for a portion of the requisite funds. Although the ratio of
external financing to funds available internally declined in 1947, it
is estimated by the Department of Ccmnierce (2) that four billion dollars
of net new issues were raised through the capital markets in 1947 by
(1) "Available data indicate that outside of investment companies, the
ratio of such external financing to funds available internally from
retained profits and depreciation charges was definitely lower in
1947 than in the late twenties." Survey of Current Business « Vol. 28,
March, 1948, Page 11.
(2) Ibid." Page 12.
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corporations other than investment companies. This appears to be above
the levels of the late twenties and probably was the highest in history.
In the late twenties, including 1929, it is estimated that the new
issues—new domestic private security issues less retirements—did not
much exceed 2.5 billion dollars, exclusive of investment companies,
something less than commonly thought. However, considering the inflated
price structure of today, the real investment financed by these net
issues, probably did not differ so much as the dollar amounts would
indicate.
The period between the twenties and the end of World War II was
marked by an excess of retirements over new issues. In 1936, the highest
year for net new issues during that period, less than 1 billion dollars
was raised on balance from the security markets. This reflects the
generally lower level of business activity and investment in the thirties,
and indicates that corporations on the whole accomplished expansion in
the immediate prewar period by means of funds obtained from current
operations.
In 1947, there was a substantial increase in security issues
and over two-thirds of the amoxmt of net security issues took the form
of bonds. The remaining one-third took the form of common and preferred
stock, with the former of much greater importance. The volume of both
common and preferred stocks issued in 1947 held at 1946 levels, but there
was a much larger rise in bonded indebtedness. The following table shows
the changes which took place.
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TABLE III
Changes in Corporate Secxirities Outstanding and in Their
O-wnership
1946—1947
(Billions of Dollars)
1946 1947
Net Issues by Industry Group:
Industrial and Miscellaneous $ 2.5 |2
P. U. (and telephone) .3 2.1
Railroad - .5 0
Net Issues (l) by Type of Security:
Conmon Stock .1 .9
Preferred Stock .3 .4
Bonds and Notes 1. 2.8
Net Purchases (2) by various Groups:
Commercial Banks .3 .2
Mutual Savings Banks .2 .2
Life Insurance Companies 2.0 3.0
Foreigners - .2 0
Domestic Individuals, etc. 0 .7
1. New issues less retirements.
2. Purchases less sales.
Sotirce: Adapted from United States Department of Commerce, Current and
Prospective Plant and Equipment Expenditures, Survey of
Ctirrent Business . Vol. 28, March, 1948, P. 11.
F\mds raised by corporations, other than banks and insurance
companies, through security financing came from financial institutions
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aad individuals. The law, of course, strictly limits the emomt of equity
issues which may be bo\ight by banks and insurance companies, and so these
institutions lai;gely purchase bonds. The banks during 1946 and 1947 took
but a relatively small share of total corporate issues; the life insurance
companies on the other hand taking nearly four-fifths of the increase in
such securities. Individuals in 1946 and 1947 bought stocks and sold
bonds on balances. Due to purchases offsetting sales in 1946, there was
no change in net position; in 1947, their stock purchases held the same
volume, but bond sales declined, resulting in a net increase in portfolio
holdings of seven billion.
One explanation for the great increase in money raised by bonds
may be that the public utilities, which more commonly finance by means of
debt issues than do the more risky industrial enterprises acco\mted for
a much higher proportion of public financing in 1947 than in 1946.
As may be seen by reference to the above table, half of the
increase in security issues during 1947 is attributable to the industrial
and miscellaneous industries, of -w^ich the most important portion came from
the manufacturing industry. The other half is about evenly divided
between the telephone and electric and gas utilities. The Department of
Commerce notes that net industrial issues dropped slightly from 1946,
whereas the volume of net public utility issues (other than railroads)
increased by a substantial amount. The decline in manufacturing issues
from 1946 to 1947 was associated with a doubling of undistributed profits
while capital requirements increased more moderately.
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The Department ofCommerce has broken doivn the 1947 figxires on the
sources and uses of funds to show separately three of the major industrial
groups—manufacturing, electric and gas utilities, and railroads.
TAHLE IV
Sources and Uses of Corporate Funds by Selected
Industries, 1947 (2)
(Billions of Dollars)
Manufact-
turing
$ 14.1
Rail-
roads
Uses
Plant and Equipnent
New
Used
Inventories (book values)
Receivables (trade)
Sources
Retained Profits
Depreciation
Cash and Deposits
United States G-overnment Securities
Payables (trade)
Federal Income Tax Liability
Other Current Liabilities
Net New Issues
Bank Loans (excluding mortgage loans)
1. Other sources aad use not shown when they amount to
less than 50 million dollars in each industry.
2. Less than 50 million dollars.
Electric
and Gas
1.1 $ 2.1
7.0 0.9 1.8
.4 (2) .1
4.0 .1 .1
^.7 .1 .1
14.1 1.1 2.1
6.5 .2 .2
E.4 .4 .5
- .9 - .1 (2)
.7 .1 .1
.6 .1 (2)
1.8 .3 .1
.3 (2) (2)
1.5 (2) 1.0
1.2 .1 .2
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Source: Adapted from United States Department of Conmeroe, Current
and Prospective Plant and Equipment Expenditures, Survey
of Current Business . Vol. 28- March, 1948, Page 11.
The electric and gas utilities made particular use of external
financing, mainly through the issuance of new securities, vrith retained
profits and depreciation charges accounting for one-third of fixed capital
expenditures and new issues and bank loans for the other two-thirds. For
such companies, therefore, internal financing was only half as large as
external finaDcing.
The role of the commercial banks in supplying funds to the
capital and mortgage markets has been smaller than that of the insurance
companies (about whose activities more will be said later). The Monthly
Letter of the National City Bank of New York for November, 1948, (l)
states that the commercial banks have invested larger amounts in railway
eo^uipment trust certificates and municipal short term obligations, but
that the major part of sucli investment represents reinvestments of currently
maturing obligations. The same source shows that bank loans under the
heading "other securities" (mainly corporate and municipal) have increased
only $81 million.
The biggest loan category consisting of coramercial, industrial,
and agriculture loans shows a rise of onlj'- $584 million this year as compared
(1) The Monthly Letter of the National City Bank of New York for
November, 1948, Page 123.
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vdth 2249 for 1947. Total loans of member banks plus investment other
than United States Grovemment securities has risen 1.3 billion in 1948
against $3 billion in the same period of 1947. In this same period, the
insurance companies total loans increased 2.535 million dollars and
thsir holdings of business and industrial securities alone by 2.563
millions.
Compilations by the Commercial and Financial Chronicle shov/
that corporations, state and municipal governments raised 6.13 billions
in new funds through new security issues, in the first nine months of
1948, against 4.7 in the same period of 1947. 1948 is expected to
exceed the $7 billion raised through new security issues in 1947.
Continuing the 1947 trend, the vast biilk of the new issues are in bonds
in the proportion of 9-1.
CI . Financing Through Stock Issues
The Commercial and Financial Chronicle is the source for the
following table which indicates the breakdown between preferred and
CQmmon stock offerings since the year 1935.
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TABLE V
New Capital Raised by Stock Issues 1935—October, 1948
(Millions of Dollars)
Year Preferred Stock Common Stock Total
1955 |54.5 $14.8 #70.3
1936 90.0 262.5 352.5
1937 204.6 203.5 408.1
1938 47.9 18.6 66.5
1939 26.0 70.8 96.8
1940 61.2 74.1 135.3
1941 93.9 79.1 173.0
1942 102.6 15.8 113.4
1943 55.1 36.7 91.8
1944 132.8 90.0 222.8
1945 430.4 226.3 656.7
1945 741.9 729.7 1471.6
1947 589.3 619.5 1208.8
1948 (To Oct.) 407.5 410.8 818.3
SoTirce: "Capital Flotations in the United States", Commercial and
Financial Chronicle
.
Adapted from issues of January 6, 1940,
Vol. 150, P. 19; Monday, January 29, 1945, Vol. 161 P. 501;
Monday, January 26, 1948, Vol. 167, P. 3; Monday, November 22,
1948, Vol. 168, P. 3.
These figures do not, of course, include equity financing where
TDrivate placanents were made. Private placements have increased somewhat
in popularity since the passage of the Securities Act of 1933 which involves
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considerable expense in the registration of new security issues over
$200,000 in amount and sold to more than twenty people. Business has
fomd the expense of registration and prospectus issuing burdensome and
escapes it wherever possible by private placanent with fewer than twenty
investors. In addition, closely held corporations do not resort to public
offerings to satisfy their capital needs.
However, sufficient of a trend is indicated by this data to
note certain broad facts; notably the scant amount of equity financing
that was done during the prewar and war years. In the prewar years, this
was due to the generally depressed condition of business, and in the war
years to the reliance of industry on government war contracts for a major
part of its financing. Even during the depression years, wide variations
in volume are evident. As government "pump-priming" gave a semblance of
recovery to the business scene in 1947, equity financing increased. The
too rapid withdrawal of government from its p\mip-priming rate in 1938
precipitated a "recession" and equity financing skidded to one-sixth of
what it was in 1937, from 408 millions to 66.5 millions. The end of the
v/ar bro\:ight the need for expansion which is reflected in the sharp rise in
total stock issues beginning in 1945 but more noticeable in 1946. It is
significant to note that despite the continued need for equity capital
since the high point of almost 1,500 millions was reached in 1946, the
traid is dovmward in 1947 and continued in 1948. The first ten months of
1948 showed a total of 818.3 millions in stock issued; the corresponding
period for 1947 shows a total of 937.8, and 1947 dipped better than 2^
alUions below 1946.
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Normally, public offerings of equity securities are practical
only for large enteirprises with earning power already well established,
especially when the shares are already sold on an established market.
Transferable subscription rights may be offered by such concerns to
existing stockholders as a device which greatly facilitates financing and
reduces the cost of financing. Smaller and less well-known business find
that flotation of equity issues is far more difficult and costly, except
possibly in periods of prosperity and rising stock prices.
The Securities and Exchange Coraroission has issued a study (l)
of the cost of stock flotations by corporations with assets less than
$5,000,000. In the six and a half years from January 1, 1938, to June
30, 1944, only 184 issues of this tjrpe were offered through investment
bankers. Gross proceeds amounted to §101,568,000. Common stock issues
were offered to the value of $52,044,000; preferred stock issues were
offered grossing $71,829,000. The Commission found that small companies
attempting to raise capital through the sale of equity securities have
been faced with paying out a substantial proportion of the proceeds in
cost of flotation, principally for the services of investment bankers.
Reference to the table at the beginniigof this section will show
that the period covered by the study was one in which investors did not
show much interest in common stock issues, and the major part of equity
financing was throiigh preferred stock issues. In the succeeding years of
(Insecurities and Exhange Corarnlssion, Cost of Flotation of Equity
Securities by Small Com,x>anies
.
Philadelphia Statistical Series Release
No. 744, October 22, 1944.
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1945 and 1945 1 th.e end of the war and expansion needs caused renewed
interest in equity financing, and th.e stocks of relatively small companies
such as were covered by the SEC study, became more saleable with the
resulting rise of the security markets. The decline of the security
markets in 1947 and 1948 reversed this situation; now even large, well-
established concerns face considerable difficiilty in finding equity
capital.
C2 « Funds for stock Investment
Joseph Dodge, President of the -American Bankers Association, in
a speech before that body (l) emphasized the need for nev/ savings to
maintain and expand our industrial growth. The volume of individual
investment funds available for the purchase of corporate equity
securities depends in this oo\mtry upon the volume and distribution of
personal savings, and the relative attractiveness of equity investment
as compared with other types.
The Committee on Postwar Tax Policy in 1945 made an exami-
nation (2) of federal estate tax returns (1927-1942) for the purpose of
discovering the relative importance of corporation stocks as a foim of
fenture capital ownership in estates of varying size at different periods
of time.
(1) Dodge, Joseph, "Savings and Debt", Commerical and Financial Chronicle
,
Vol. 167, Thursdajr, June 17, 1948, Page 2.
(2) Committee on Postvrar Teix Policy, T^ax Program for a Solvent America,
Ronald Press, New York, 1945, Pages 78-"79. ~
"
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This examination disclosed certain interesting facts. I'irst
that as the size of the net estate increases, a larger proportion of
corporation stocks are held, and that, at that time, there had not yet
been a flight from corporation stocks on the part of wealthy investors
due to high income and estate taxes. In 1942, 34 per cent of net estates
in the $50,000
—
$100,000 class was invested in corporation stocks and 64
per cent of estates over$1,000, 000. In 1927, approximately the same
proportions held true. Secondly, there has been a relative grovrbh in the
number of estates below|500,000 over the years covered by this survey.
In that period, 1938—1942, the number of estates below|500,000 is notable
and marks a greater importance for the estates of |LOO,000-#5000,000 as
holders of corporate stocks. The committe attributes this shift to the
division of laa^e estates through transfers at death or distributions
during life, but it seems possible that the higher rates of taxation
prevailing during this period made the accumulation of million dollar
estates more difficult. Finally, the committee concludes that:
"Personal accumulations of fortunes are, relatively to
their total size, an important source of risk capital.
The stocks held were no doubt of every description
—
*blue chips*, 'cats and dogs*, and family enterprises.
Of whatever character, they represent investment choices
and decisions made at some time or other in the past.
They, therefore, reveal a willingness to assimie some
degree of risk, large or small, in American enterprise (l).
Nevertheless, the continuance of high personal tax rates which
now in the highest brackets take up to 85 per cent of a man' s earnings
(1) Committee on Postwar Tax Policy, Tax Program for a Solvent -America,
Ronald Press, Nev; York, 1945, Page 81.
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coiild result in almost completely choking off the supply of risk capital
available for investment by individuals in equity securities. The high
progressive tax structure has tended to redistribute dovaiv;ard the wealth
of the country. Obviously, the only way to continue individual invest-
ments is to alter the investment habits of persons vath lov;er incomes so
that they will purchase stocks to a far greater extent than they have in
the past. In the past, individual investors of the lower income group
have largely restricted their investments to savings accounts, life
insurance, and government obligations.
Not only is the high personal income tax a deterrent to stock
investment; income earned on capital raised thro\)gh stock issues must
undergo double taxation. First, the corporation must pay a coarporate
tax amounting at present, to 38 per cent. Secondly, the profits paid out
by the corporation as dividends to the individual investor are subject to
the personal income tax ranging from 19 per cent to 85 per cent.
The illustration used in the introduction will bear repetition
at this point. In 1947, Westinghouse Electric Corporation paid common
dividends amounting to $1.25 a share. In order to pay that dividend the
corporation had first to pay federal and state income taxes amounting to
85 per cent a share. The Westinghouse stockholder had then to pay sur-
tax rates ranging from 19 per cent to 85 per cent. The stockholder who
was in the 50 per cent bracket paid a total of 1.47 to the tax collector,
thus retaining only 62 per cent out of an original 2.10. At the 1947
average, stock exchange prices, that amount constituted a new cash return
of little more than 2 per cent and state and local government had yet to
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get its share. Tlie wealthy investor in the highest bracket would achieve
a net return of less than 1 per cent, obviously far too small a return
to justify taking the risk.
The only manner in which a wealthy investor may hope to secure
a favorable return is through realizing a capital gain on the resale of
the stock. Unfortunately, for this hope, the benefits of a moderate
capital gains tax amounting at present to but 25 per cent, is lai^ely
offset by the provision that net capital losses may be deducted from other
income only to a limited extent. This is particularly true in a period
of stable or declining stock prices, such as is now the situation, and
has been since 1946.
In any case, the reliance of the wealthy investor upon capital
gains to secuT-e a fair return, rather than uiton the income from continued
ownership, does not appear likely to provide a continuous supply of
venture capital to productive enterprise. Furthemore, large amounts of
money and types of owners are excluded from the ownership of equity
securities, which from a social point of view probably should be included.
A pessimistic outlook as to the future of individual stock owner-
ship which is engendered by consideration of these facts is not relieved,
but rather heightened by the expectation that Congress in 1949 will impose
not lower but higher personal and corporate income taxes. It has been
shown that to the present, the l\all of the funds for stock investment were
derived fromvealthy individuals and estates created by wealthy individuals.
Further, diminitive of either funds available for equity investment or
the return from such investment could have unfortimate economic con-
sequences.
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Why a_ Shortage Risk Capital
A. Historical Sources of Risk Capital
The great- bulk of our risk capital has always been supplied by
those who had sufficient income to be able to take the risks of invest-
ment, that is, by those in the "upper brackets". The only other com-
parable source has been the retained earnings and savings of corporations,
many years of successive increases (l) in the personal income taxes
have reduced to a new low the ability of individuals to create risk
capital. Since the Thirties these successive increases have been
especially aimed at the high income classes for social as well as revenue
purposes under the New Deal philosophy of redistributing the wealth.
At the same time (during the Thirties and also during Vjorld War
II) when individual income tax rates were being increased (2), corpo-
rations were being prevented by the excess profits tax and Section lOE
(designed to prevent "unreasonable" accicimlations of corporate wealth)
from retaining earnings which might, in part at least, have substituted
for dwindling individual contributions of risk capital.
A recent study (3) illustrates the erosion of individual income.
(l) It is interesting to note that when personal income taxes are increased,
it seons only fair that upper bracket increases should be steeper; on
the other hand when taxes are reduced, it does not seem fair that upper
bracket decreases should be at the same rate as in the lower income
brackets.
Reaching a high point of 90 per cent during the war.
(3) Lawraaoe, Joseph Stagg, Capital Markets and National Defense,
Banking ; Vol.
,
April, 1948, Page 33.
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In 1916, 40,000 individuals vd.th pretax income of $25,000 or more had $3,2
billions after taxes. This Tvas the "kitty" to which industry and new enter-
prise resorted. In 1929, 103,000 in the (3:roup had $7,3 billions after
taxes. By 1942, this group had declined to 92,000 individuals vrith $2.2
billions after taxes. Since the relative levels of national income in
these three years were $45 billions in 1916, $85 billions in 1929, and
$122 billions in 1942, it is easily seen that absolutely and relatively the
reservoir to which enterprise could appeal had shrunk.
In the early days of this country and as late as 1914, foreign
investments were important as a source of risk capital. While these in-
vestments lost their fonner iniportance with the transfoimation of the
United States from a debtor to a creditor nation, persistent large-scale
liquidation of foreign holdings of oxir OQmmon stock have aggravated the
existing shortage of risk capital.
As mentioned above, the only comparable source of funds for
business has been its retained earnings. It is estimated that out of the
gross capital formation in this country, business has normally supplied out
of its savings the two-thirds going into maintenance and replacement of
capital goods, and one-half of the net capital fomation—the construction
of new productive facilities. The importance of retained earnings is
shown by the fact that the tremendous expansion following World War II has
not been financed to any great extent by sales of equity securities and
debt incurred has been restricted by the consequent risk of xinbalajicing the
corporate structure.
During the six years from 1939 to 1945, non-financial corporations
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doubled net workiiig capital with almost thre©-fourths of the total increase
of $27.5 billion dollars occurring in the four war years. Post-war con-
struction of capital goods resulted in corporate dissavings of nearly $7
billions in 1945 and $1.5 billions in 1947. The following table illustrates
the importance of retained profits and reserves in 1946 and 1947 as well as
other sources and uses of corporate f\inds.
Table YL
Sources and Uses of Corporate Funds (l)
1946 and 1947
(Billions of Dollars)
Uses
1946 1947
$23.8 $26.7
Plant and Equipment:
New .....
U'sed .....
Inventories (book value),
Receivables (trade);.
From business
From consumers
From Grovemment .
Other current assets
Sources
Retained profits (2)
Depreciation .
Cash and Deposits
U. S. Government securities
Payables (trade):
Business
Government
10.5
1.1
7.5
5.8
1.6
- 2.0
- .7
23.3
6.3
4.1
.3
6.1
3.8
.8
14.2
.5
6.7
4.0
1.3
- .2
.8
26.7
10.1
4.3
- 1.0
1.5
1.0
(3)
1. Ezclusing banks and insurance companies.
2. Including depletion.
3. Less than 50 million dollars
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Sources and Uses of Corporate Funds
1946 and 1947
(Billions of Dollars)
1946 1947
Federal income tax liability « 2» 5 2.3
(3)
Bank loans (excluding mortgage loans); .
Short- 1em
jjong— Veim •••••••••
1.9
1 A.
. J. . 4
1.6
1 A.
Reconstruction Finance Corporation ooans
Net new issues
- .2
2.3
(3)
4.1
Plant and eq.uipnient
VJorking capital
Refunding, refinancing, etc
2.2
1.2
3.8
3.3
1.1
2.2
Hetireaients 4.9 2.5
Discrepancy (uses less sources) .5 0
3. Less than 50 million dollars.
Source: Adapted from United States Department of Commerce, Current and
Prospective Plant and Ec^uipment Expenditures, Survey of
Current Business . Vol. 28, March, 1948, Pasre 10.
The follovdng sections will inquire into the reasons for the
present disinterest of "upper bracket" investors in equity securities as
well as other influences bearing on the problan, notably the investment
policies of the insurance companies, and the effects of government policy.
B. Ineqiilties of Tax Structure
A newspaper editorial (l) recently summed up the current tax
IT5 hypocrisy of Taxes, Boston Herald , Decanber 17, 1948, Page 32
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situation in excellent fashion. It pointed out that a foreign student of
America AD, 1948, drawing his deductions from our federal tax structure,
would conclude our social philosophy to be something like this:
1. "Profits from investment in productive enterprise are
of questionable social value (we tax them twice, on
corporate levies and personal income from dividends)."
S. "Wealth, even though acquired in some socially advan-
tageous way, needs to be penalized. (We slap a
sharply progressive higher rate on upper incomes.)'*
3. "The risking of savings in venturesome undertakings,
such a radically new business, is rather disapproved.
(We levy such high taxes as any profits that it is
better to invest for security.)"
4. "The white-haired children are the small wage-earners
who plan to save nothing for capital investment.
(They get the income tax exemption or low rates.)"
The editorial goes on to point out that the plausible explanation
is that we have taxed ability to pay rather than social values. This, too,
is the new point of Senator O'Mahoney of %-oming who said virtually the
same thing on a recent round-table broadcast (1). However, it appears
that the person who saves a few thousand dollars to invest in corporate
shares gets taxed twice on his income, and in Massachusetts, he pays a
higher rate on his evil gains. The assimiption, no doubt, is that he sets
in slothful ease raking in his ill-gotten gains, while his neighbor works
hard for a living. As will shortly be made clear, taxes on the highest
bracket incomes are so high as to constitute a penalty laid on the most
successful.
Possibly, taxes should be imposed for other reasons than revenue.
President Conant of Harvard has expounded the view that high estate and
TD -America United , December 9, 1948, WBZ 11:30 P.M
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inheritance taxes can make a more fluid society by preventing dynasties of
wealth. This attitude is probably sound but this leveling of society can
only be accomplished in a general sort of way. As the editorial writer
puts it:
"If we are going to say that earned income in more
valuable to society than the profits of investment
(a higher arguable generality), then ought we not to
distinguish between the earned income of a higher
skilled surgeon and that of a race bookie? If a man
who spends his money on dependents is better than a
man who spends on wine and song (if not women), should
we not reward also by tax concession the man who buys
non-fiction books, wheelbarrov/s , and long red under^rear?"
The conclusion, then, on the part of any intelligent person who
attanpts to appraise our federal tax structure, is that it is shot through
with contradictions and hypocrisies. The wage earner who appears to be
the beneficiary of the heavy load laid on upper bracket vrage earners and
corporations is not as well off as he may feel. Corporate taxes, which the
lowly wage earner feels are justified and not high enough, are necessarily
included in the prices which the wage earner must pay. Taxes which siphon
off the vital flow of risk capital reduces the capacity of our society to
increase its standard of living.
"The wage earner viho congratulates himself on his own
low income rate and does not notice the indirect taxes
he pays nor the deadening effect of the loss of incentive
is simply being fooled." (l)
1. The Personal Income Tax.
While many causes exist for the present scarcity of risk capital,
JT) B^ocri sy of Taxes, Boston Herald , Decanber 17, 1948, Page 52.
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one of the really fundamental reasons is the present high individual income
taxes. Karl Marx listed the graduated income tax as one of the most potent
weapons for the destruction of capitalism. It is probably that Marx would
have placed his stamp of approval on the tax scale now in use in the United
States. Risk capital will either be provided by the middle and upper
income brackets under private enterprise, or it will have to come from the
government under a system of state socialism. Today, the middle and upper
income individual finds too little left after taxes to encourage invest-
ment, and the trend to dependence on government for capital is illustrated
by Senator 0'Mahoney*s recent proposal for HFC loans to small corporations
which cannot obtain risk capital elsewhere.
What are these tax rates, then, that have resulted in drying up
the flow of risk capital (l).
Let us look at the effect of these tax rates which prevailed \intil
April, 1948, for example;
The individual vdth surtax net income of $10,000 who makes a
successful risk investment which returns him an additional net income of
$1,000 must pay 36 per cent of it to the Federal Government alone. If his
income is $25,000 and he makes a successful risk investment which returns
him an additional net income of $1,000, he must pay 56 per cent of it to
the Federal Govemraent alone. If his income is $50,000 and the same
investment is made, he must pay 56 per cent of it to the Federal Government
(l) These examples are adapted from an address by Senator Milliken before
the Economic Club of Nev/ York City, March 4, 1948, as reported by the
Commercial and Financial Chronicle, Vol. 167, of Thursday, March 11,
1948, Page 26.
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alone. Thus a person vriLth an income of $50,000 or more pays more into the
Treasury than he is allov<'ed to keep for himself.
Consider also the married tax payer with two dependents and -vdth
net income before exemptions:
In order to have the same income left after taxes under present
tax rates as he had in 1939, an individual with a net income of $5^,000
a year in 1939 must have today a net income of $5,864. It takes a net
income of $9,500 to give the same income after taxes as was enjoyed by a
tax payer with an $8,000 net income in 1959; a $12,257 income today to
match a $10,000 income in 1939; and a $20,119 income to equal a $15,000
income in 1959. To match a $25,000 income in 1939, it is actually
necessary to have an income of over $40,000 today and a $50,000 income in
1939 represents the equivalent of an income of nearly $124,000 today.
The higher up the income bracket, the greater is the increase in
income necessary to match an equivalent income after taxes in 1939. A
$228,000 income novj- is equal to an income of $75,000 in 1939, and an
income of over $1,260,000 would be required today to give the same income
after taxes as a $500,000 income in 1939.
The harshness of our steeply progressive income tax rates may be
realized in looking at the relation of income taxes paid per dollar of
income by taxpayers in different brackets. Assume a single person with
no dependents and with a net income before exanption:
the $ 5^000 income man pays 10 times as much as the $1,000 income man
the 10,000 " If tt 25 n tt tt tf tt n tt n
the 20,000 « tf n 70 ft " ti M n it it tt
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the $ 25,000 income man pays 99 times as much as the $1,000 income man
the 50,000 " " " 265 " »t » « n n tt
the 100,000 nntt 669 """"" "
the same comparison made using a net income base before exemption of $5,000
the $ 10,000 pays 3 times as much as the $5,000 man;
the 20,000 " 7 n n « ti tt n «
the 25,000 " 10 " " " " " " "
the 50,000 "27 " " " " " « "
the 100,000 «t 69 " " " " " " "
By the late thirties, the New Deal philosophy of "soaking the rich"
became well established in the federal tax structure and redistribution of
the wealth through a distorted tax scale had begxin. These distortions vjere
advanced and magnified by the advent of World War II. Since the government
was undeirwriting industry, there was little concern about the margin of
savings in the middle and upper brackets. Anything which repressed invest-
ment excepting in war production was considered justifiable.
After the war, however, there no longer existed justification for
such policies. The peacetime econoniy under free enterprise should be
financed out of private savings and not be dependent upon the government,
\uiless we wish sooner or later to enter on a system of state socialism, or
strict government planning.
For proof that such a prospect is not idle fancy or a "bugaboo"
advanced by businessmen, all one need do is take a quick look at Great
Britain. That country raised its tax rates long before the United States,
having adopted the graduated income tax in 1910, three years in advance
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of this coimtry. After World War I, the United States reduced its income
taxes at the same time it lightened the debt biirden. G-reat Britain main-
tained the wartime rates vdth this result: In 1911 before the British
income tax became very heavy, savings represented approximately 16 per
cent of total national income, by 1929, the ratio was down to 11 per cent,
and by 1938, the ratio had decreased to under 7 per cent.
This decrease in the national savings naturally resulted in
decrease in the private capital supply in Great Britain. The result has
been apparent; British industry has stagnated rather than progressed. It
lacked the capital investment necessaiy to expand, and keep up vjith new
inventions. It could not meet the British people* s doaands. It is becom-
ing socialized. Today, the output of American industry (operating under
a free enterprise system) is being utilized under EGA to build up British
socialized industry, the United States providing the capital investment.
Unfortunately, many do not grasp the full significance of this situation.
There are in the United States approximately 54 million indi-
vidual taxpayers; of this number about 52 million have net incomes of
\mder f5,{XX> before personal exemption and credit for dependents. These
52 million taxpayers pay about $12 billion of an ann\:ial estimated tax
liability of $21 billion (l). Wide public support is necessary if there
is to be any change in the tax structure which would relieve the b\irdon on
the middle and upper classes. How do the 52 million feel that the 2 million
(1) These figures were obtained from the address of Senator Eugene D.
Milliken of Colorado and have been slightly altered by the 1948
taxation. However, prospects for increased taxes v.lth the 81st
Congress in 1949 may result in these figures being too conservative.
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should be taxed?
Early in 1947 a Gallup Poll (l) registered the sentiments of a
representative cross-section of Americans as to what they believed a
married man -with two children and earning $10,000 a year should pay in
Federal income taxes. Answers averaged "about $900", approximately half
of the $1,700 the government took at that time. The public v/ould reduce
the $29,000 tax of the $50,000 income family to $7,500.
In addition, the question also -was asked: "About how much do
you think a married man with two children who earns $60.00 a week—that is
$3,000 a year— shotild pay in Federal income taxes?" The average was
"around $50.00", comparing with an actual tax of $151.00 (2).
Since the time of this poll, there has been a slight reduction
in Federal income taxes. However, the foregoing illustration is still
valuable as an expression of public opinion.
The net result of these tax rates has been inevitably a lack of
incentive not only to invest in venturesome enterprise and take risks,
but a lack of incentive for these individuals to strive to build their
incomes by still more strenuous endeavor. Why should a man with. $50^000
income upon which he must pay Federal income taxes assume risks out of the
ordinary and toil harder to double his income. If successful, he will
(1) These figures were obtained from the address of Senator Eugene D.
Milliken of Colorado and have been slightly altered by the 1948
taxation. However, prospects for increased taxes with the 81st
Congress in 1949 may result in these figures being too conservative.
(2) While the tax reduction of 1948 slightly alters the exact figures,
the figures may be low after the anticipated tax bill of 1949.

61
Why a Shortage of Risk Capital
raise tbe amount he is peimitted to keep from $29,000 to $36,000. Fiirther
effort and toil might raise his income to |E0O,00O, In that way, he
could keep $14,000 more after making his income tax payment.
Obviously, these individuals cannot be blamed if they are dis-
inclined to invest in anything which involves risk. Aa investment banker
(1) says that his fiim keeps a "taxable eq.uivalent" yield table in front
of them at all times to enable them to tell customers liable to the higher
rates that a municipal bond yielding 2 per cent viill give them Just as much
spendable income as a common stock yielding 8 per cent. Thus, unq,uestion-
ably tax-exempt bonds absorb some "might have been" risk capital.
Since the time of the G-allup Poll and since Senator Milliken
furnished the figures used in the foregoing pages, the Eightieth Congress
(Republican) in April enacted a new revenue low somewhat modifying the
harsh effect of the existing tax structure. Let us look at the new tax
rate as increments of income at different levels, since it is these
increments, diminished by the tax, that the Individual must weight against
the efforts and risks involved in any given project.
Of the increment of income between #90,000 and $100,000, the
individual is now allowed to keep 36.75 per cent, as against 17.92 per cent
under the old low; of the increment between $40,000 and $50,000, he may
keep 50.40 per cent, as against 47.37 per cent; of the increment between
(l) Phelps, Thomas W. , The Stockmarket as a G\iide in Managing Life
Ins\irance Portfolios, CoPHnercial and Financial Chronicle , Vol. 168,
Thursday, October 14, 1948, Page 15.
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$9,000 and $10,000, he may keep 80.64 per cent, as against 71.50 per
cent (1).
In addition the revised law gives split-income "benefits to all
taxpayers. The provision is of genuine help to the upper-bracket tax-
payer when the rates climb swiftly. By dividing his income in half, he
pays the surtax as two anall pieces at lower rates than would apply to the
total. The following table illustrates the savings possible under the
provision:
How Postv,(ar Tax Cut Affects Income of Married Man with Two
Children in Various Brackets
Net Income before Old Tax under Non- New Tax with
Exemptions community Law States Income Split
5,000 589 431
10,000 1,862 1,360
20,000 5,890 3,888
25,000 8,521 5,475
50,000 24,111 16,577
100,000 62,301 45,642
150,000 104,538 79,508
200,000 147 , 269 116,605
500,000 406,600 358,676
750,000 622,725 563,995
1,000,000 838,850 769,314
Source: Adpated from '^oiar Postwar Taxcut", Business week . No. 970,
April 3, 1948, Page 21.
TT] Tax Rates and Income Distribution, Guaranty Survey , Guaranty Trust
Company of New York
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It is apparent ttiat the tax bill resultf»d in measurable savings
to the upper-bracket taxpayer but considering the ideal of a maximum tax
of 50 per cent on incomes advanced by many businessmen, it is equally
apparent that the tax bill fell short of what was considered ideal. Per-
centage reductions in tax rates were made ranging from 12.6 per cent on
the first $2,000 of taxable income through 7.4 per cent on the additional
up of $136,719.10, to 5 per cent on the remainder.
Whether the $4.8 billion tax cut has resulted in additional risk
capital being made available is questionable. The McGraw-Hill Survey
which appeared in the May 8, 1948, issue of Business Week shows that
|1.5 billion of the tax cut would benefit upper-bracket taxpayers, and
that much of this would be ready risk capital looking for investment. It
showed that business executives making $15,000 or more will save 7 per cent
of the money they keep as a result of tax reduction they will invest 52 of
these savings in common stocks. The survey concluded that if all upper-
bracket people followed this pattern, more than $500 millions of risk
capital would be made available. Furtheimore, 28 per cent of the execu-
tives questioned planned to shift from bonds to common stocks at least a
part of their savings.
Unfortunately for these fair prospects, this survey made in May,
was followed by a November election which practically asstires that these
favorable features of the 1948 tax revisions will be rescinded by the
81st Congress. The prospect is for increased taxes particularly for the
middle and upper income groups are not for a fiirther reduction as was hoped
for in 1949. Therefore, the prospect of increased investment from these

64
Why a Shortage of Risk Capital
income groups is very slim indeed. The reverse is more likely—a further
diminution of the supply of risk capital.
2. Capital Q-ains Tax
There has always existed a sharp division of opinion as to
whether capital gains are income or not. The Suprecae Court long ago held
that capital gains were income and income tax law has always treated them
as such. To the ordinary individiaal such gains clearly appear income and
shoxild be taxed as such. It wovild take some explanation to establish in
his mind that the gain accrued over a period of years and some allowance
should be made. (Nevertheless, the Committee on Postv/ar Tax Policy (l)
points out, if the law were amended to allow lowered rates; the taxpayers
deduction of capital losses would have to be limited since the taxpayer
can to a larger extent control the taking of s\3ch losses and without
limitation, he could greatly reduce or eliminate the tax on his other
income.
)
On the other hand, it has been urgued that capital gains are not
true income and should be exempt from taxation. The Committee on PostVv'ar
Tax Policy (2) took into consideration that the existing tax affects
normal market transactions and that its provisions are complicated but
concluded in 1945 that "at least for the next five years" the tax sho\ild
be continued in the present foim.
(1) Committee on Postwar Tax Policy, A Tax Program for a Solvent America,
Ronald Press, New York, 1945, Pages" "9T-1W.
T2] Ibid Page 100.
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Of course in 1945 there was not the acute need of risk capital
that exists today and the Comniittee if writing today on this subject might
change its mind. It is interesting to note that Rosv/ell Magill, Chairman
of this Committee became Chairman of a special tax study committee appoint-
ed by the House Ways and Means Committee in June, 1947, which came out for
changes in this and other taxes as a means of providing additional equity
capital.
The Tax Cormnittee of the Association of Customers Brokers in a
1948 study (l) appraised the situation as it exists at the present and
found that while the holding period means little to the man on the street,
it distorts market action. At times, it accelerates the rise in stocks
by deterring owners of securities in the higher brackets from selling and
becoming subject to the tax, and at other times depresses the market
\mduly when holders risk to establish losses while prices are low. Investors
and speculators rely on the judgment of tax experts and accountants rather
than their own free judgment in the upper brackets. Investors unwilling
to commit capital for sic months are excluded from supplying venture
capital.
The tax also reduces Governmental revenue derived from the narket.
The tax committee quotes one authority as estimating the capital gains and
loss provisions cost the government 59 million in revenues from 1938 to
1942.
ITT Tax Committee of the Association of Customers Brokers propose Change
in Capital Gains Tax, Commercial
^
and Finaacial chronicle
.
Vol. 167,
Thursday, March 11, 1948, Page 21.
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The last published figures of the Treasury show receipts from this source
to have been a little more than 12 million for the year 1940. In recent
years the Treasury has not published segregated figures of revenues from
this source, possibly because of their insignificance.
The capital gains provision was never intended as a revenue
producing feature of the tax structure. There vras a social reason rather
than a desire for additional revenue behind this tax. The holding period
was apparently intended to encourage the investor—by definition of this
act an investor is one who holds securities longer than six months—and
discourages the speculator. However, the line between speciilation and
investment appears too tenuous to be governed by any arbitrary time element.
In addition, as the study points out, a reasonable amoimt of speculation is
essential to free enterprise system. American industry and agriculture
were developed by the taking of risks.
Furthermore, the committee points out that leading bankers blame
a large part of the grovdng rise in long-term coramerical loans from 1946
to the present on the inability of corporation to raise capital through the
nomial method of issuing new stocks. The capital gains tax must be
accounted one of the causes of such inability.
The suggestions of the committee for revising the tax to give
the government more revenue and corporations raise venture capital, and
revitalizing the securities market are as foUov/:
1. Eliminate the six months holding period. The 1942
Revenue Act revised the eighteen and twenty-fovir month
holding period previously required to six months.
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The change did not encourage excessive speculation.
2. Tax all capital gains at present rates regardless of
time held.
3. Treat capital gains separately from income and eliminate
the permitted maximum charge off of $1,000 of capital
loss against the income, but penait the carryover of
capital losses to be applied to capital gains for eight
years.
This program imdoubtedly would maJce more venture capital available
by giving incentive to the higher-bracket investor vdthout adverse affect
on the lower-bracket taxpayer. In fact, if the suggested revisions should
result in the Treasury collecting more revenue, as the Committee believes
it will, the lovrer-bracket taxpayer and government xvoiild be benefited.
3. Estate Tax
As early as 117 B. C. the Eg3rptians applied succession taxes to
both personal and real property. The tax was considered a redemption fee
from the riiler, in whom rested title to all things. The tax was continued
through the Roman occupation and was adopted by the Romans. The intro-
duction of the tax in Rome is attributed to the Emperor Augustus who
ordered all Ramans to include in their wills a bequest of not less than
5 per cent to the state.
In our ov/n economy such men as Thomas Jefferson and Theodore
Roosevelt have favored the limitation on the power of the individual to pass
on his wealth due to death. All countries now impose this tax and the
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proceeds go to swell the Treasury receipts as part of the regular tax
burden. In the United States, the rates were first imposed in 1898 repealed
in 1902 and repassed in 1916. The follomng table indicates the pro-
gression of the rates since the inception of the tax:
Table VII
Rates of Estate Taxes
1898-1948
Year Per cent Levied
1898 155^
1902 Repealed
1916 10^
1917 15^
1917 2Ufo
1926 Reduced 20^
1932
1934 SOfo
1935
1940 77^
1948 Eased by Split Income Provision (ll
1. The nevr ] rt-' in effect req"ulres that a Federal estate
tax be placed on only one-half of the net amount that
a husband leaves outright to his wife, after exemptions,
or that a wife leaves to her husband.
Source: Social Aspects of Estate Taxation, Trusts and Estates Manazine
,
October, 1948, Page 286.
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The objectiYe of the estate tax vihen first enacted was undoubt-
edly revenue. However, the estate tax has not turned out to be of great
revenue importance to the Federal Governtnent . Figures show (l) that in
1926 under the mild administration of Andrew Mellen, the government
collected a little over $100,000. In 1932 when the first big increase was
made, collections were $23,674. In 1934 at a 60 per cent rate $96,216, in
1935 at a 70 per cent rate, |155,496, in 1942 when the maximum rate of
77 per cent was reached, collections were but $309,691. Obviously of
little importance when compared with collections of over 20 billions from
the Federal income tax.
As the taxation of estates and gifts in this country became part
of the permanent tax system, the social purpose of equalizing wealth became
of greater importance. Under state laws the primary motive is undoubtedly
revenue (although the social motive is not entirely absent) since the
state progressive rates have subjected children and other diT-ect heirs to
lesser rates than more remote bequests. However, it is apparent that some-
thing more than the raising of revenue was in the minds of those who
fostered the progressively heavier Federal rates conmencing in 1932 with
the advent of the "New Deal". The point at which a tax becomes confiscatory
depends laiigely on the mental attitude of the individual. However, the
77 per cent rate should appear sufficiently confiscatory to satisfy the
most ardent socialist.
It is fair to assume then that in comparing with the steep sur-
(1) Gommittee on Postwar Tax Policy, Tax Program for a Solvent .America
.
Ronald Press, New York, 1945, Pages 159-162.
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tax rates of the Federal personal income taz, the estate tax is now intended
to aid in the redistribution of the wealth. Certain other purposes are
sametimes mentioned to justify the tax. It has been claimed that inherit-
ance taxes are necessary to prevent the escape of some taxpaying ability
in the community and insure a just distribution of the tax burden in
accordance with the ability to pay. Also, it is urged that the tax is a
means of "collecting back taxes", that anyone who amassed a fortune un-
doubtedly escaped taxation somewhere along the line. However, the social
motive has steadily grown in importance and now may be said to outweight
the revenue motive.
It is possible that economic effects of the estate tax have not
received sufficient attention. The Committee on postivar tax policy (l)
considered these effects in two ways: first, their influence in the
economic motives of men, and second, their consequences for the volume and
managerial organization of the capital fund.
The Committee agreed that there is no general answer to the first
question. Different individuals have different values and traits. Hard
work to accumulate wealth for the satisfaction engendered by it; others to
provide for themselves or dependents. In any case, however, "there is
probably some degree of frustration in the prospect of death taxes so
severe as to involve expropriation by government of a substantial part of
th.e fruits of one* s life work". Heavy estate taxes undoubtedly rob the
(1) Committe on Postwar Tax Policy, Tax Program for a. Solvent America
.
Ronald Press, New York, 1945, Pages 159-162.
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enterprise system of some of the incentive which are so necessary to its
continuance. This effect is more severe when the amoimts of tax to be
levied is xmcertsdn and cannot be calciilated in advance.
The second question may be more definitely ansivered. The main
economic argument against inheritance taxation has been that it constitutes
a destruction of capital. This is fsCLlacious. Any other tax which required
the payment of the same amount of money by any person would have the same
effect on capital. Nevertheless, the effect on capital is adverse. This
is due to the abrupt and drastic change in capital ownership which the
heavy tax may ccanpel. Forced sale of assets may destroy family control,
passing the business to others without the same interest or ability.
Business may then deteriorate and then capital be destroyed or diminished.
The logical conclusion is that death taxes co\ild be so heavy that purchasers
for the capital would be impossible to find and government would take over
with a much greater chance of universe and inefficient management. Some
would favor the tax for just such a purpose—the taking over of private
business by government.
The Committee found on examination of estate tax returns that as
estates increase, their holdings of common and preferred corporation stocks
are proportionately greater. These facts, namely the extent to which cor-
poration stocks enter into the net estate and the prospect of enforced
liquidation in order to pay the tax, give weight to the adverse effects of
heavy death taxes upon the institutional organization of going concerns.
4. Double Taxation of Dividends
The Commercial and Financial Chronicle carries in a Jiily, 1948,
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issue (1) the results of a siirvey made by a noted Nev; York utility
executive, John A. Ritchie, as to the corparatiye "wages" received by labor
and investor. This survey shows that while corporate profits amounted to
$17,400 million last year or 8.6 per cent of the national income, labors
share in wages and salaries from private business totaled $105,200 million
which represented 52 per cent of the national income.
Wages and salaries showed a dollar gain of 132.41 per cent over
1929 while dividends increased by only 16.73 per cent. Only $6800 million
was paid out to investors in dividends, all the remainder was retained in
the business.
In real value
—
purchasing power—labors share in 1947 was 81 per
cent greater than in 1929, while dividends paid investors last year v;ere
reduced in purchasing power by 9.18 per cent over the same period.
Thus the fellow who takes a chance and puts his money into corpo-
rate equities finds his real income from such investment lowered at the start
through the economic need of the coirporation to retain a larger amoimt of
inflated dollars it earns. In addition, once he has received this income,
taxed once which in the hands of the corporation, he must pay an additional
Federal tax and in Massachusetts a state tax more severe on dividend income
than earned income.
An illustration of how this double taxation of dividends works in
practice will be found in the introduction as given by the President of the
Til The Commercial and Financial Chroninlpt ^ Vol. 168, Thursday, July 15,
1948, Page 18.
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Westinghouse Company who foxmd that the average stockholder of that company
after taxes could expect a net return of only 2 per cent on his investment.
This cannot be considered particularly inviting in view of the risks in-
herent in industrial investments. He considers this illustration sufficient
explanation of why individuals have chosen tax-exesnpt bonds, savings
accounts, insurance, etc., ahead of common stock.
Venture capital is made available only when in the opinion of
the investors they have an opportunity to receive rev/ards which are com-
mensiirate with the risks involved. Because of high corporate income tax
rates and the high individual surtax rates, the individual v/ith a large
income nets only a very anall percentage of return on the capital he invests.
Consequently, the incentive for investment of funds declines as the capacity
of the individual to make such investment increases. Security of capital
becomes the dominant factor in considering investments rather than maximum
productive use. In addition to the discouraging of equity capital, this
double taxation featiire accomplishes an equally undesirable end by encourag-
ing corporate debt. Creditor or debt financing is at present encouraged by
the Federal tax system through the deductibility (and consequent exemption)
of all interest payments. Since dividends distributed are not deducted from
coirporate net income for Federal tax purposes and interest payments to bond-
holders are so deducted, equity financing is discriminated against in favor
of debt financing.
That this is no idle conclusion is borne out by the "Monthly
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Letter" (l) of the National City Bank of New York which points out that
the vast bulk of the new security issues are bonds—stock issues acount
for only one-ninth of the new issues total.
If money is available only for the best credits and then only as
a loan business is very likely to slow do^m. The utility industry (2)
well illustrates this situation. It can borrow money readily for 5 per cent
but must pay 6 per cent or more for equity capital. Since the SEC frowns
on a mortgage debt of more than 50 per cent, the utility industry must find
equity capital in addition to incomiijg debt. Other industrial companies with-
out the restricting influence of the SEC may easily incur more debt than is
good for than.
5. The Case for Accelerated Depreciation Deductions
i^erican industry today faces the serious problean of being unable
to replace plant and production facilities with the normal reserves accimu-
lated thro-ugh depreciation and amortization of assets. Industrial leaders
have been pointing out that this situation ma?,'- have serious consequences
in the near future, not only to the nations peacetime economic health but
also to its ability to be adequately prepared industrially in event of
mobilization for war.
The problem is now particularly acute because construction and
facility costs are at extremely high levels and depreciation allowances
(1) Credit Developments, Monthly Letter, National City Bank of New York ,
November, 1948, Page 123.
T2] The Investor, Boston Globe , November 19, 1948, Page 25.
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based on initial cost are inadequate to cover current replacement costs.
It is estimated on the basis of a 63 cent dollar that a company having
fully depreciated a 1939 machine costing |l,000 -will have to earn an
additional ^1,000 to cover the cost or replacement of the machine.
A previous section pointed out that the Treasury Department
attitude prior to the amendment of the Revenue Act in 1934 allowed the tax-
payer considerable latitude in setting depreciation rates on his fixed
assets. As long as they appeared reasonable the Department did not challange
them. The amendment to the act places specific responsibility upon the tax-
payer to justify reasonableness of rates used by him, and led to publica-
tion of a pamphlet—Bulletin T—setting forth approved rates.
Since the rates of depreciation on production rates and machinery
are based quite often on unreasonably long estimates of life, in keeping
vath Biolletin "F" (l), many mart.ufacturers find their older equipment still
has a high undepreciated value. As a result, the purchases of new, more
modem, more serviceable, and more productive equipment is discouraged
because of this unrealized ve^lue placed arbitrarily on old eq-uipment in
use.
In order to stimulate the purchase of nev; equipment and keep the
industrial machine in good order, industry maintains that depreciation
policies as they stand must be liberalized. Since by any method of
depreciation, no more than the original cost of any asset can be ultimately
v.rpitten off as depreciation, they policy of draining out that writeoff
(1) Income Tax Depreciation and Obsolescence, Bulletin F Revised,
United States Treasury Department, Bureau of Internal Revenue,
Washington, D. C, January, 1942.
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over a period of many years and neglecting to take into consideration
technical obsolescence appears fallacious from the economic standpoint,
itoerican strength depends on industry keeping up vdth technological develop-
ments and ability of new industry to grow and form.
"The determination of the amount of the depreciation allowance
and deduction gives rise to more controversy than almost any other item
in the tax return" stated the Magill Report (l). Industrialists and in-
dependent tax authorities testified repeatedly that present allowances
for depreciable assets were inadequate to maintain a healthy economy and
permit replacement at present cost levels insuring industrial adequacy in
event of a national emergency.
It is held by seme that the general rise in earnings v/hich it is
assummed industry is enjoying in viev; of the huge dollar profits currently
being reported should solve the replacement problem. Hovrever, as has been
pointed out before, a company showing a comfortable net on perhaps $3
million of sales annually before the war, with war and post?/ar expansion
may now barely break even on three times that volme. Expanded capacities
with higher labor, material, overhead, operating and selling costs plus
currency devaluation have cut earnings to such an extent that even larger
dollar profits may be quite low when based on sales volume or invested
capital.
Currently some of the larger manufacturers are dealing vdth the
(l) Revenue Revisions 1948
,
Report of the Special Tax Study Committee
to the Committee on V/ays and Means, United States House of
Representatives, November 1, 1947.
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depreciation problem in different ways. Some companies have increased
depreciation charges from replacement of facilities (l). Others rely on
general contingency reserves established dTiring or since the war, hoping
they will cover rises in replacement costs. Some concerns have revised
fiscal and dividend policies to provide funds for purchase at inflated
prices. The main point is that any of these polcies recognizes that costs
are -understated and profits overstated at least to the extent necessary to
replace plant and equipment.
What is meant by the teim liberalized or accelerated depreciation?
Paxil T. Norton, (2) Professor of Industrial Engineering, Virginia
Polytechnic Institute, defined it as a process of writing off the invest-
ment in the asset more rapidly in the early years of its life than would
be the case if straight line depreciation were used mth a rate based upon
the full expected life. Accountants often point out that the only time
accelerated depreciation policy is one peimittin'T the taxpayer to use any
accounting procedure applicable to his operations as long as it was follow-
ed insistently without duplicate deductions.
The Treasury Department in a recent report (3) stated that
limited accelerated depreciation would help small business finance capital
(l) United States Steel is reported to have charged off an additional
12|- million in the first half of 1947 alone.
"The Conference Board Business Record", National Industrial Conference
Board, New York, Vol. Ill, No. 1, January, 1946.
(5) "Taxation and Small Business", Division of Tax Research, United States
Treasury Department, October, 1947
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outlays in industries where large amounts of depreciable assets are re-
quired. Risky and grovdng enterprise woxild benefit. As a means of
improving accessibility of capital and removing tax determents to risky
investment, accelerated depreciation vrould be more effective than a reduc-
tion in tax rates costing the same amount of revenue.
The one serious aspect of the report is the possibility that
relief will be limited to small business and so constitute a subsidy.
However, the study was limited to anall business and may not reflect overall
Treasury attitude.
The Treasury's main objection to liberalized depreciation is the
loss of revenue especially v/hen there is a possibility of return to deficit
financing. Hov/ever, the stimvilation to business and the increase in profits
resTolting from industrial modernization inevitably would broaden the tax
base. Thus, the long runover all effect of accelerated depreciation vx)uld
be to increase Federal revenue from taxation vdth no corresponding increase
in the tax rates. Far better it is that the Federal budget be balanced by
a wholesome growth in national income than through improper and undue
levies on industry through the mechanism of inadequate depreciation
allowance.
6. Excess Profits Tax -Undesirable and Unfair
The excess profits tax as administered during wartime, was signed
to draw off the profits accrxiing to every kind of corporate business through-
out the country as a result of the tremendous expansion and acceleration
of the economy produced by expenditxires for war. Many businesses that had
no direct part in war contracts shared in this expansion, such as hotels
and theatres.

79
Wliy a Shortage of Risk Capital
Some justification for the tax diiring vrartime may be found.
Business was operating at full capacity on orders supplied by the govern-
ment. It vms probably preferable that a portion of corporate earnings go
to government and reduce somewhat the inflationary financing of the war.
But, hov>'ever justifiable, the tax may be as a war measure it has no place
in the peacetime economy.
Any tax based on excess profits is necessarily arbitrary since no
acceptable fixed or absolute criterion of an excessive profit has been
found. Tax lavfs of this character must establish arbitrary standards for
the measiirement of such excess, and the standards chosen will be influenced
by the revenue needs. This is shovm by the fact that successive revenue
acts have steadily reduced the return on invested capital. This motive
was apparent in the shift made in 1941 v/hereby excess profit was deteimined
by using the entire corporate income as a base instead of the corporate
income after payment of the regular corporation tax as was provided in the
original act of 1940.
In the face of governmental need for additional revenue to
finance an 1949 budget possibly in excess of 40 billions, and governmental
dislike for imposing additional tax on lower income taxpayers, the new pro-
jected excess profits tax might easily be calculated solely on the basis
of additional desired revenue without proper regard for an equitable base,
if in fact, there exists an equitable base for such a tax.
The principal reason for opposing such a tax during peacetime is
that such a tax would interfere with the fxmction of profits, which in
normal times is that of stimulating the flow of investment, guiding the
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direction of the flow and inducing reduction of costs. Y/here there is
freedom to invest and to compete, the best ranedy for high profit is high
profit. If the immediate profit ret\rm in a particialar field is high, it
may indicate either that there are greater risks to be met vdthin that
field, or that in fact it has been unusually prosperous. A high return
stimulates either further investment or an exploration of the risk involved.
There is a steady tendency toward an equalization of investment returns,
although complete equality is never reached because in a dynamic and pro-
gressive economy, all of the risk differentials can never be eliminated.
Any attempt to apply taxation of excess profits as a remedy would freeze
out any risk undertaking which was beyond the tax ceiling.
Application of such a tax in peacetime based on some hypothetical
standard of fair profits would have a particularly serious effect on new
and growing concerns. Such concerns are the future producers of new pro-
ducts and the future employers of labor. Old, large, well-established
concerns would probably be benefited, temporarily at least, for the tax
would encourage monopoly by such large concerns, by discouraging the growth
of new concerns which normally could be expected to provide action
competition.
In addition, the nomal incentive to careful husbanding of
resources in obviously lacking under an excess profit tax. This was
apparent during the war. Management became notoriously lacking in "expense
consciousness when the total corporate Federal tax rates stood at 85|- per
cent. We might e3cpect a similar laxness in managements attitude if the
projected excess profits tax should be enacted into law. Putting a penalty
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on efficient operation is not the best way to benefit either the national
economy or the individual consimer.
Another evil v/hich might spring from the imposition of such a tax
would be the additional press\ire in corporations to borrow. Profits, it
should be made plain, are at an all-time high but grossly overstated due to
inadequate depreciation provisions and the illusory inventory profits.
High taxes have driven equity investors to cover. The corporation depends
more and more on.profits to finance its requirements and despite high
profits has relied increasingly on debt securities. New security issues in
1948 were by a porportion of nine to one, overwhelmingly bond issues. By
depriving the corporation of the means of internal financing, the excess
profits tax will force more and more borrowing. This is certain to damage
the economy.
An excess profits tax then, must be arbitrary, and will dis-
criminate against new and growing business. It encourages inefficiency
and wasteful spending vdiile discouraging initiative and enterprise. It is
extronely complex and difficult to administer. Lastly, it interferes with
the fimction of profits and forces the incurrence of debt.
One October 15, 1948, Mr. Fred M. Vinson, then Secretary of the
Treasury, appearing before the Senate Finance Comraittee in favor of repeal-
ing the wartime excess profits tax (l) stated:
"Repealing the excess profits tax means getting out of the
tax system a tax vdiich certainly in its present foim has
no place in the peacetime system. The case against this
excess profits tax for 1946 goes beyond the facts that it
(1) Repealed effective December 31, 1945.
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is primarily a wartime control and that it is erratic
and inequitable. It is also an obstacle to that re-
conversion and expansion of business which is so
necessary for a high level of employment and income" (l).
Government taz revenues now take such a large proportion of the
national income that the government cannot afford to be heedless of the
effect of tax legislation on the economy.
C» Insurance Companies and Risk Capital
1. Position of Insurance Companies
The investment of insurance funds is Important chiefly because
the acceptance of praaiums by the insurance company means that reserves
(which represent advance collections from policyholders) must be maintained
for all the contracts issued on the life and endowment plans and that
obligations incurred \mder these contracts do not mature as a rule until
the distant futin*e. To meet these future obligations or reserves, the funds
are invested in various foims of securities. Since these funds so invested
constitute a guarantee for the payment of claims, it is of the utmost
importance that the greatest care should be exercised to conserve them
properly agednst loss.
Insurance contracts may run for both long and short periods of
time. In general, short-teim insurance policies represent protection against
loss of property; long-teim policies against loss of life. The investment
problems of fiinds covering short-tem risks is usually not difficult. Short-
tem inves-teients and bank deposits can take care of these obligations.
Aldrich, Winthrop W.
,
Capital rormation and the Equity Market «
The Chase National Bank of New York, Novffliber, 1948, Page 11.
. r
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The reserves for claims and xmeamed premiums of insxu^ance cam-
panies have two important characteristics, (l) liabilities are estimated
on the basis of past experience, and (2) the company in its investment
practices need not usually consider charLP:es in the purchasin?^ power of the
dollar (as far as reserve for premiums and unpaid losses are concerned)
since the obligation is to pay dollars. The changing price level, how-
ever, is of much concern in connection with the capital or surplus of a
stock company and with operating expenses of any company.
The textbooks generally present a list of important factors
governing the investments of insurance companies such as security of prin-
cipal, adequacy of yield, necessity of diversification, market ability
and maturity. Security of principal is stressed as the most important
single element since the primary purpose of the company to pay claims.
Speculative investments which may yield large profits but also may involve
large losses are considered definitely unsuitable for insurance companies.
The various states have imposed restrictions on the investments
which may be made by insurance companies. Their piirpose is to define what
constitutes—in the eyes of the various l^islatures—sound investment of
f\mds, and at the same time to see that these principles are followed. The
laws generally permit investment in the stocks and bonds or other evidences
of indebtedness of any solvent domestic corporation. However, a life
insurance company is not usually peimitted investment in common stocks,
although certain states are more liberal in this respect. Stocks in general
are considered objectionable as an investment for insurance companies on
the follov/iDg gromds:
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1. If the insurance company has less than a controlling
interest, the investment is at the mercy of those
holding the majority interests.
2. If the investment is larger, there is the temptation
to control the company. This means participation in
a field v/hich is foreign to the business of insurance (l).
Legislation favors investment in bonds which may be purchased v.dth
due regard to security; yield, diversification, marketability, and maturity,
Furthemore, investment expense is lov;. Therefore, as the insurance in-
dustry has expanded its accimiulations of the American public* s money, the
industry has tended not only to invest in bonds, but to place a larger
percentage of their investment in bonds. The Monthly Reviev/ of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Boston for October, 1948, shows that New England life
insurance companies put two-thirds of their investment fimds in bonds in
1946, as compared with one-third for 1930. Stock investments were infin-
itesimal. The ratio of corporate stocks to the entire assets of the com-
panies was 6 per cent in 1900; today the same Monthly Review sets the
figxire at 2.6 per cent of assets nationally.
The larger extent of investment in bonds (and slight interest in
stocks) is the more important because of the dimensions the industry has
achieved in the past three decades. The 1921 Insurance Year Book showed
that 288 companies possessed total assets of almost 8 billion which were
increasing annually at the rate of about 600 million. Fortune
(T) Ackeman, S. B.
,
Insurance
.
Ronald Press, New York, 1928, Page 528.
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Magazine (l) reports in 1948 a total insirrance in force of 190.5 billion
vdth an excess of income over disbxirsements, amomting to 3.5 billion
annually. Of course, this figure is magnified hy inflation—in teims of
1940 prices this 190.5 billion total has a purchasing value of only 114
billion.
Investments made by insurance companies have been greatly
affected by economic conditions existing at the time the investrnents were
made. Immediately after the Civil War, capital was needed to construct the
railroads. Duirlnp; the two World Wars, insurance companies made extensive
investments in United States government bonds. The capital needs of build-
ing; construction companies have also been met by insurance funds.
After World War II in 1946, American industry was able initially
to obtain equity capital in addition to borrowed money in order to finance
plans for expansion. As the source of equity capital dried up, industry
found it increasingly necessary to borrow. Since the high tax structure
had eliminated the individual investor as the major market for corporate
bonds, industry has looked more and more to the insurance company as a
source of funds. This is shown by the continuing trend toward direct
placement with insurance companies of entire issues of fixed interest
obligations, and the placanent of about 40 per cent of the total of 1948
corporate issues with insurance companies. At the same time, insurance
funds placed in mortgage have declined from 34 per cent of total assets in
1930 to 16 per cent in 1946. Real estate reached a peak of 9.3 per cent
(1) The Insurance Billions, Fortune Magazine , Vol. 37, April, 1948,
Page 109.
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in 1946 and fell to a low of 1.1 per cent in 1946 (l)
This situation has posed a serious problem for the iimerican
economy. Insurance companies seek outlets for employment of 52 billions
of assets, but restricted largely to debt securities supported by adequate
equity; American industry seeking funds for expansion and replacement and
unable to sell equity securities. This has resulted in corporate financial
structures becoming unbalanced— too much debt is offset by too little
equity capital. Since even the relatively stable utility companies should
not incur debt to an extent greater than 50 per cent of capitalization, the
problem is evident (2).
2» Contributions to Risk Capital
Stock investments had become the subject of so much adverse
criticism by the 1920' s that the ratio of corporate stocks to the entire
assets of the companies was only 1.4 per cent at the close of 1921 as com-
paried with nearly 6 per cent in 1900. Today the percentage stands at
JT) Monthly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Vol. 50, October,
1948, Page" "3."
(2) Mr. Stahrl Edmunds, the Economic Analyst of the Northwestern National
Life Insxirance Company said in an ariticle entitled Outlets for Life
Insurance Investments in the Harvard Business Review , Vol. 25, Summer
issue, 1947: "Because the nationa^l economy has arrived at a state of
advanced and intensive industrialization, a relatively greater proportion
of equity capital is required for the development of nevT commercial and
industrial enterprises. At the same time, life insurance companies
still retain their traditional status as lenders, rather than providers
of equity capital, even though their capacity for capital accumiilation
has grown to be one of the foremost in the economy. These tvv-o develop-
ments are mutually incompatible, and, if not adjusted, may veiy well
have disastrous consequences for the economy and life insurance alike."
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3.6 per oent. Some of the companies although not legally obligated to
refrain from such investments advertised that none of their funds were
invested in stocks. Various state legislatures enacted laws prohibiting
the investment of life insurance funds in such seciirities, or in loans
whose collateral consisted of stock to one-third or more of its value.
Consequently, the opportunities for life insurance investment
in this field were definitely limited. However, the insurance companies
have not taken full advantage of such opportunities for stock investment
as the laws peimit. It is estimated that the total amount of life in-
surance investments in common stocks is about 250 million—a very small
proportion of the 50-odd billion available for investment.
Life insTirance companies generally are now authorized, subject
to restrictions of course, to buy and hold guaranteed and preferred stocks.
At the end of 1947, the companies owned about 1.1 billion of these
seciorities, having increased their holdings during the pasttwo years by
about 400 million. The total volme of preferred stocks which might be
purchased by life insurance companies is not only distinctly limited but,
at the present time, many corporations appear hesitant to use this type
of security to meet their capital needs.
The John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company of Boston may be
taken as an example of the extent to which conservatism and awareness of
its fiduciary nature has permeated the insiirance industry. This company,
which is the largest in the United States outside of the New York—^Nerreirk
area, is restricted in its investments only up to the point where three-
fourths of the policy reserve is so protected. After this point is reached.
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the law allows the company a pretty free choice of investments. Fortime (l)
Magazine reports that the John Hancock Company possesses a surplus over and
above the full policy reserve of more than 166 million, allovdng the company
considerable freedom to take advantage of more venturesome and better yield-
ing investments, yet the company in 1948 owned less than 15 million in com-
mon stocks. Stocks amounted to 4.1 per cent of the total assets of the
company on January 1, 1948, and of this figxire, 3.4 per cent are preferred
or guaranteed shares.
This company, like every other company in the industry, is find-
ing it difficult to invest its money at a satisfactory rate of return. Yet
this company, like every other, refuses to depart from the orthodox way
even to take advantage of the limit of the law.
3. Disadvantages of Providing EqTilty Capital
In many segments of the life insurance business, there are
objections to common stocks and it must be admitted there are disadvantages
to them. The major considerations which led to restrictive legislation
two decades ago were (l) the feeling that life insurance funds were trust
funds and, therefore, it was not suitable that they be used for speculative
investments, and (2) the feeling that insurance officials should be
restrained from the temptation to organize and finance other companies for
private gain. The New York insurance investigation of 1906 showed clearly
that, if insvirance companies are allowed to invest in stock, it became
possible for some of their officials to organize and finance banks, trust
(T) John Hancock Life, Fortune Magazine , Vol. 37, April, 1948, Pages 11-160.
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companies, and other corporations for purposes of private gain.
It is possible that these two historical objections coiild be
overcome since the governmental power to regulate industry and outlaw un-
desirable practices has been so greatly increased in the past two decades.
More modern arguments in opposition were advanced in 1947 by the Economic
Analyst (l) of the Northv/estera National Life Insurance Company. He lists
the following formidable difficulties in the way of common stock investinent:
1. There is no assurance in a common stock investment as
to the time nor the amount of dividend payments; yet
life companies must earn an annual and certain income
to accumulate the reserves made necessary by their contracts.
2, The marked fluctuations in price of common stocks made
it difficiilt to value the common stock held by an
insurance company so as to convey the soundness of the
investments. Valuation at market price would at times
put the insurance companies in the light of making
exorbitant capital gains and at other times appear to
be technicaJ-ly bankrupt. "Valuation at cost on the other
hand would make possible the concealment of bad investments.
The capitalization of earnings makes possible a formula
for common stock valuation. But capitalization of even
minim\im average earnings assumes an intimate knoT/ledge
(1) Edmunds, Stahrl, Outlets for Life InsTirance Investraent, Harvard Business
Review
.
Vol. 25, Sumnier, 1947, Pages 418-420.
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of corporate earning; s and dividends available only
if life insurance companies participated in management
of these corporations, opening the -way to another
objection.
3. Life insurance companies due to the large amounts
they must invest would become the largest single stock-
holders in many corporations. Too great involvement
of life insurance in the management of industrial
companies could raise the political question of con-
centration of economic power and conceivably result
in the possibility of prosecution under the anti-
trust laws.
4. The possibility of insurance companies causing even
more erratic fluctuation in the stock market through
trading in large blocks of stocks. The companies to
keep fully and prudently invested must invest 5.5 billions
in new money each year in addition to 1.5 to 2 billions in
old money. Fortune Magazine (l) stated that the 3.5
billions alone could buy up practically all the assets of
the United States automobile industry. Ten years from
now, economist Stahrl Edmunds has estimated the money to
be invested in a single year will be 615 billion, enough
to build a transcontinental railroad system the size of
the Pennsylvania and Union Pacific combined with enough
(T) Insurance Billions, Fortune Magazine
, Vol. 37, April, 1948, Fa^e 110,
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left over to "buy the physical assets of United
States Steel. It is conceivable that a large volume
of selling—even though routine and in good faith-
could cause a panic causing ill will toward the
life insurance business.
5. Even without the foregoing problems, there is still
the question as to whether in the long run listed
common stock offers an investment outlet of adequate
volume. Life insurance assets today total 48 billions;
the stock listed on exchanges 70 billions. Life in-
surance assets tend to double each decade and it is
doubtfiil that in thirty years there would be sufficient
new common stock to prevent its drying up as an
insurance outlet.
Mr. Edmunds (l) concludes that a change in the statutes
which now practically prohibit common stock purchases is
not desirable in view of their inadequacy as an insurance
outlet in future years, preferred stock, in this economists
opinion, offers more advantages and less disadvantages
than common stock as an insurance company investment.
Greater assurance of income—especially v/ith emulative
preferred stock—^makes less possibility of involvement
(l) Edmunds, Stahrl, Outlets for Life Insurance Investment, Harvard Business
Review , Vol. 25, Summer, 1947, Page 420.
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in corporate management. Bijyiri^ and selling of
preferred stock vrould affect only a small segment of
the market. A valuation formula has been evolved by
a committee of life insurance representatives which
shoxild offset the tendency of stocks to violent
swings in prices, unfortxmately the volme of pre-
ferred stocks is insufficient to absorb a sizeable
part of the insurance funds available for investment.
4. Do Advantages Offset Disadvantages
V/hile many of the aiguments against the holding of common stocks
might be answered, nevertheless, if there were no real and compelling
reason for the purchase by the insurance companies of equity stocks, these
argments might well be decisive. The major reason which has been advanced
for such investment is the slovdng down of the flow of savings into in-
vestment, at the same time that capital needs have reached an all-time high.
A Tv/entieth Century Fund report (l) published in May of 1947
stated that up as much as one-third of our industrial plant (v/hich is valued
at 200 billion by prewar prices) needs modernization, an additional invest-
ment of 100 billion is necessary at 1948 prices. The fimd estimates that
40 billion would be needed to modernize city streets and rural highways;
that 115 billion is necessary to meet minimum housing requirements by 1960;
and that 27 billion would be needed over a fifteen-year period to conserve
natural resources and develop water power.
(l) Buttenweizer, Benisirin J., Let life ins\jrance companies satisfy our
capital needs, C^omrtercial and Financial Chronicle. Vol. 167, Thursday,
January 8, 1948, Page 50.
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The Lionel Edie organization made a study (l) in J" lily of 1947
entitled "Capital Requirements of Private Industry". This report states
that on the basis of a gross national product of 194 billion annually,
private business expenditures on new construction and desirable equipment
shoiild amount to 21 billion per annum. From 1925-1929, such expenditures
ran from 2-12 billion per annum. From 1931-1940, such expenditures never
reached 9 billion. But in 1941, they v/ere 11 billion; in 1946, 17 billion;
and in 1947, estimates put such expenditures at 21 billion.
The Question then arises as to the present and futixre means of
satisfying these capital demands. If 21 billion is required annually,
14.5 billion should come from undistributed profits and reserves, leaving
6.5 billion to be raised in the capital markets. From 1925-1929, the Lionel
Edie organization estimates that the savings of those in the higher brackets
(4 billion) was more than sufficient to meet industrial requirements
(2.2 billion). Now there is only 1.2 billion of such annual savings to
meet the estimated annual need of 6.5 billion. In addition, the liquid
savings of the United States which stood at 40 billion in 1944 have declined
to 37 billion in 1945, then skidded to 14.5 billion in 1946 and were only
4.5 billion at September of 1947.
At the same ttnie that the savin^^s of those in the upper income
brackets and total individual savings have been falling off, the insurance
industry assets are gowing at an annual rate of 3.5 billion. Obviously, the
TH Buttenweizer, Benjamin J., Let life insurance companies satisfy our
capital needs. Commercial and Financial Chronicle . Vol. 167, Thursday,
January 8, 1948, Page 50.
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insurance industry is the foremost source of investment funds today, and
the source is restricted almost entirely to debt securities.
The National City Bank of New York in its "Review" for November
of 1947 summed up the situation as follov.'s:
"In the present juncture, the supply of nevf savings out
of current incomes of individuals is seriousljr deficient
in relationship to the demands for capital. For example,
the individual investor has come close to disappearing
as the source of new capital for private business ."
"The individual savings that take place today in largest
volume are either institutionalized savings, reflected
in accumulations of insurance or pension fimds, or
savings in anticipation of consumption."
"These funds are not available for equity investments and
common stocks. The absence of substantial individual
saving for taking risks of ownership is a serious missing
limb in the structure of soxind financing of postv/ar
prosperity. Without them, the pressure is in the
corporation to sell bonds and to go further into debt to
the banks and to the institutional investor."
The foregoing should make it clear that there is a definite need
for eqiiity financing by the ins-urance companies both to protect their cor-
porate bond holdings T.iiich must have an adequate equity base if the insurance
companies are to enjoy investments which are indeed "safe" and to keep the
insurance companies fully and usefully invested.
Furthermore, certain advantages Vvlll accrue to the insurance com-
panies by means of their equity financing.
1. Many studies have shovm that portfolios divided between
fixed obligations and equity securities fare better than
portfolios restricted entirely to fixed obligations.
Losses on some of the equities vail be compensated or
better by increases in the other. Fixed obligations
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are restricted to their payment at maturity.
2. The building of housing projects, the loaning of
a larger percentage of cost or valuation than usual
based on careful forecast of future earnings, has
already made insurance companies equity investors.
By stock purchases, the profits of such enterprises
during the good years could provide a cusliion for
"amortization" of losses in fut\ii'e years.
3. Restriction to debt investment may result in the managers
of financial institutions making fewer investments vj^hen
they have favorable anticipations of fut\ire capital
productivity and interest rates, than if they had
unfavorable expectations. An economist of the CED
advances this as the major explanation for the building
up of cash balances a failui-e to use excess reserves by
the financial institutions in the past. Power to invest
in equities would seem to be an effective way to avoid
this situation and stimulate investment when most needed.
4. The consequence of equity investment v/o\ild relieve life
insiirance companies of the problem of low interest rates.
The record of over-all corporate profits in the United States
is s\ifficiently encoiiraging to indicate that in the long
run profits will provide a reliable basis for life insiorance
operation.
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5. A decline in business due to inability to secure sufficent
equity capital v/ould affect the ability of many policy-
holders to continue their policies.
Many of the disadvantages to equity financing constitue real pro-
blems and are not easy of solution. However, serious thought and study
might provide an answer. For example, some loss of principal due to com-
mon stocks taking the first impact of bad times might be offset by setting
up a reserve out of the relatively high average yield. This same device
could also be utilized to correct the irregularity of income. The political
problem raised by the possibility that common stock holdings vdll give life
insurance companies too much influence in corporate management can be off-
set by legal limitations as to the amount of any one common stock which can
be held by an individual company. Possibly, the most diffic\ilt problem is
not technical or legal, but psychological—overcoming the traditional cool-
ness of insurance company officials toward equity issues. Nevertheless
there is evidence that these officials are not unaware of the situation (l).
D. Fear Ps:^^chology from Investor* s Standpoint
The Federal Reserve Bulletin in its Survey of Consumer Finances
shows that from January, 1940, through December, 1947, individuals
accumulated §86 billion in currency and bank deposits, $55 billion in
savings and loan associations and in insurance and pension reserves, and
$57 billion in Government bonds.
(l) Harrison, George L., Life Insurance Companies and Equity Financing,
Coiamercial and Financial Chronicle , Vol. 167, April 22, 1948, Pages 6,25,26.
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Table YIII
Changes in Fom of Liquid Savings of Individuals
In the United States from January 1, 1940 to December 31, 1947
(In Billions of Dollars - = Dis-saidn^)
Type of Saving 1940 Xy-il— 4rO xy'4 / 8 yr. total
Currency - BanJc Deposits 2.9 CQ ADO. 4 ±i. • y o. U OD. fj
Savings - Loan Associations 0.2 3.2 1.2 1.2 5.8
Insurance - Pension Reserves 3.1 32.5 6.9 6.7 49.2
Seciarities - Grovemment 0.2 53.6 0.5 3.1 57.4
Securities - Corporate - other 0.2 2.0 0.4 1.0 - 0.8
Liquidation of Mortgage - other -2.1
Debt 1.5 - 6.5 - 6.7 - 13.8
Investment in Non-fann Dwellings 3.1 8.7 3.9 5.8 21.5
Investment in other durable 7.9 37.8 14.9
Consumers goods 19.8 80.4
Source: Adapted from: Chadvdck Nathaniel Stone, Fear Psychology from the
Investor's Vieivpoint, Commercial and Financial
Chronicle, Vol. 168, Thujrsday, October 7, 1948,
Page 2.
If any substantial part of these accumulated liquid savings should
be invested in stocks, stock prices at present at low levels would rise
noticeably.
However, public interest in securities is danonstrated by the
result of a siirvey—The Federal Reserve Survey of Consumer Finances (Part 3,
J\me, 1948) (l)—which reveals that only 5 per cent of the families surveyed
TT) Federal Reserve Bulletin, June, 1948, Pages 919-927.
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in the brackets having funds available for investment favored investment
in common stocks, 9 per cent favored investment in real estate, 60 per
cent favored savings bonds, and 32 per cent favored bank deposits. More-
over 62 per cent were opposed to acq.\iisiton of common stock because of a
variety of fears. The conclusion may be dravm. that unless there is a vvlde-
spread change in investor attitude, stock prices and stock investments are
not going to improve very much over present levels.
Reasons for the fears affecting investors today were investigated
by the National Securities and Research Corporation and the results listed
and analyzed in the Commercial and Financial Chroncile (l). Since the
hopes and fears of the investor are fully as important as any other factor
affecting the problem of find sufficient risk capital, it appears worth-
v;hile to consider what this research has shown to be the ten principal
fears causing apathy toward equity securities today.
The Possibility of \'Iax
The aggressive moves of Russia coupled mth the alaimist tactics
of government leaders pretty generally have resulted in a jittery state
among investors as well as among the general public. V/hile war would
mean another gigantic industrial effort v;hich historically have sent stock
prices sharply upward—witness now Bethlehem and United States Steel
Corporation developed into industrial giants vAth the aid of World War I
—
(l) Chadv/i ck , Nathaniel Stone, Fear Psychology from Investor's Standpoint,
Commercial and Financial Chronicle . Vol. 168, Thiirsday, October 7, 1948,
Pa^es 2,52.
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the third ViTorld V/ar is likely to be on a far different plane than the pre-
vious two. The development of atomic weapons and rocket propulsion v/hich
deal devastating blows in a brief space of time and against v<rhich no
effective defense has yet been devised could very well mean the end of
American immimity against damage to the Americaji productive mechanism.
The possibility that an investment made in a corporation now
could be rendered worthless due to an atomic bonb landing on the corporate
plant may have some influence on vestor thinking. Of more importance in
influencing investor thought is probably the idea that another -mx would
mean a further extension of government controls ( to the extent that a form
of fascism might result) with resiiltant ham to the investor. The investor
knovTS that currently he is not getting enough dollars from his investments
to counter-balance the devaluation of the dollar. Since another war would
undoubtedly lead to more inflation—our present national debt of 250 billions
is already a staggering biarden—any restrictive action by government would
probably result in the investor receiving dollars of still smaller purchas-
ing power at a time v/hen prices vrere higher than ever.
The growing feeling that war is inevitable thus encourages the
idea that liquidity is the best policy and militates against equity
investment.
The expert opinion in this subject is that Ru-ssia is not economi-
cally or militarily prepared for war. Some say that it will be at least
five years before their preparations vail be completed. However, the present
Russianpolicy of expanding their holdings to a point just short of v;ar could
easily lead to war at a time in advance of any time-table the Russian
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govenment may have prepared.
2. Does the High Price Structure Foreshadow Price Declines
This fear is borne out somewhat by the fact that Christmas sales
for 1948 are falling short of the 1947 dollar value, although the 1948
price levels are higher then those of 1947. "Soft spots" appear to be
devloping in the economy and the investor fears that while dollar profits
are high at present and the rate of dividend payments in 1948 were the highest
in history, the time is coming when a break in prices could mean very little
excess in profits being available for dividend payments in view of continued
high costs.
However, the cost of living—while oppressive to certain groups
in the economy, notably non-union labor—has risen slower than the wages of
the \mion laborer, the income of the farmer, and the salaries of upper level
professional and business people. This means an excess of dollars are still
available to these groups and the resultant bidding for goods not yet in
sufficient quantity to satisfy the demands of all will tend to biiild prices
not much below present levels.
This fear discounts the billions which are being spent for
European recovery aid, for support of faim prices, for military preparations
and the billions that the government is prepared to spend if prices show any
definite sign of falling off too rapidly.
On the other hand, the high volume production of farm products
have caused food prices to decline to lower levels, and the filling up of
pipelines in the textile and industrial fields have caused a gradual fall
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in prices and some vmanployment
.
Nevertheless, while some price adjustments are inevitable, the
National Securities and Research Corporation feels that this price decline
^^dll be only at a moderate pace and that this price decline will aid in
forestalling a fourth round of wage increases which would inevitably set
off a further inflationary spiral. This means a relatively stable economy
will be the net result.
3. Can Record Earning s of Today be Continued
Earnings in 1948 will approTiTnate twice the average earnings per
share of common stocks of leading corporations made in the nine years ended
December 31, 1945. These earnings are measured in dollars per share and
since the number of outstanding shares has not been greatly increased since
the decline in the purchasing power of the dollar began in 1945, the real
meaning of the earnings statement is that the corporation is earning more
depreciated dollars per share than it did in years prior to 1945. This is
natural result of the deflation of the dollar.
Also responsible for the rise in earnings of the corporation is
the sellers market which has existed since the war. Production of goods has
not yet generally caught up mth danand and selling cost has been at a
minimum with no real competition to force price cuts. Higher than normal
profit ratios are the natural result of such a situation.
With the trend to lower prices and the production of sufficient
goods to meet consumers demands, it is extremely unlikel?/ that corporate
profit ratios of the next few years will equal those of 1947 and 1948. Other
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factors whicli may adversely affect the earninf^s pict\ires are production
costs increasing or remaining the same at a time when price cuts are
called for, stiffening consimer resistance to prices, intensified com-
petition, selling expenses increasir^c to move accmulated inventories or,
in some cases, prolonged strikes.
The "Monthly Letter" for November of the National City Bank of
New York (l) states that despite the sharp gains in dollar totals for the
third quarter of 1948, almost one-third of the reporting companies had
reduced earnings, compared with 1947 records and nearly one-half poorer
earnings than in the second half of 1948. A growing number of cases were
detected where sales volume declined and was accompanied by much sharper
drops in net income. This, the Letter concludes is due to the high "break
even points" and shows the extent to which earnings depend on maintenance
of a high volume of operations.
This evidence would seem to confiim the investor* s fears that
earnings in the future are due for a slump. However, the research effected
by the National Securities and Research Corporation leads that body to
believe that the important point on this subject "is that the seciirities
market has not discounted these exceptional earnings throtjgh a rise in
prices but on an average is discounting the future earnings if leading
corporations at approximately ten times {a lov/ ratio)". This appears to be
the rate of earnings in a normal competition year.
(1) This Letter contains an article on "Three Quarter Earnings" for 1943
and a chart showing net income of leading corporations for the first
nine months, 1948, Pages 124-125.
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Therefore, the corporation feels justified after extensiTe
research and appraisal of earnings of a great number of corporations in
stating their opinion that stocks generally are selling at a low ratio to
their future earning possibilities.
4. Stock Prices Historically are at Hiig:h Levels
Stock prices, says that the National Securities and Research
corporation currently are high in relation to only three past periods and
have been exceeded by prices prevailing in 1929, 1937, and 1946. Thomas
VI, Phelps (l) , a partner in the investment firm of Dupont and Company,
characterized the present stock market situation in "1929 upside dovm".
Common stocks of leading companies are selling at a twenty-year lov/ point
in relation to earnings. The public has three times as much money as it
had in 1929, nearly twice as many shares are listed on the New York Stock
Exchange as in 1929, but the total market value of listed common stock is
about 25 per cent less.
This situation is obviously far different than any other boom
period in the nation's history. Heretofore, the stock market has led the
upward trend in prices; now stocks appear to be the only commodity very
greatly underpriced. Stock prices in view of the fact that the dollar has
been devalued to almost 50 per cent of its 1959 value and national income
and savings in teims of the devalued dollar are at record highs, appear to
be relatively attractive from the basis of price alone.
TT) Phelps, Thomas V/., "1929 Upside Dovm", Fortune Magazine, Vol. 38,
November, 1948, Page 95.
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More than one financial wciter attributes this phenomenon of
low stock prices in a high priced era during which there has been a vast
business boom to the psychological state of mind of the nation. Edmimd W.
Tabell (l) points out that "bearish" prognostications by economists, news-
paper columnists, and Washington vra-iters began in the fall of 1945 when the
Presidential Advisory Board v/amed that a drop in business would result in
seven or eight million unemployed by early 1946, a situation which never
did materialize. Nevertheless, the "prophets of doom" have predicted
business slumps in late 1946 and early 1947 and early 1948, which in similar
fashion have failed to materialize. Noxv Tabell feels that this "mass fear
psychosis" in spite of high earnings and dividends have held back the stock
market
.
There is no doubt but that eventually there will be a correction
in the vast business boom which has been in process during the last three
years (1946-7-S}. The pent-up demands of people for goods will be satisfied,
at least, to the extent that a partial buyers market will return the
artificial support of furnished the boom by government spending for foreign
aid and the military program cannot be continued forever. And it is a fact
that no boom has ever gone on forever.
Nevertheless, the stock market appears to have discounted almost
completely in spite of the prospects for recession the boom of the past
few years. The market has no topheavy speculative positions, is not
"Til Tabell , Edmund W. , Our Greatly Underpriced Stock Market, Commercial
and Financial Chronicle
.
Vol. 168, September 9, 1948.
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operating on borrowed money, and lias not risen in price to keep pace with
increased earnings. Moreover, the expected futiire earnings even consider-
ing a falling off of business, should support higher prices than prevail
at present.
5. Operating Ratios High and Seemingly Unable to Reduce
As one magazine (l) observes, for the first time in a decade,
cost is becoming an important vrord in the businessman's vocabulary. In
manufacturing the direct costs—cost of labor and material needed to
manufacture the goods—have gone up sharply since 1948 at a rate faster
than the prices for manufactured goods. In other lines, retailing, trans-
portation, utilities, the same resiilts are noted.
Despite this rise in costs, profits have also risen. This has
been made possible by low overhead expenses— salaries, rent, interest,
depreciation, etc. These costs have also risen but insufficiently to out-
weigh the tremendous increase in volume of production as compared with
prewar.
The result is that per unit of output, the manufacturer's over-
head costs are hardly greater than they were in 1939. Prices are nearly
double in 1939 so that room is left for big profits and even bigger taxes.
The difficTilty with this situation is that the businessman must constantly
maintain his volume at a point ahead of rising costs.
Toward the close of 1948, some consumer resistance became
(T) Managements No. 1 Problem, Business Week . No. 996, October 2, 1948,
Page 19.
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apparent to some high priced goods. This touched off the fear that
material costs woiild not keep pace with any sharp reduction in prices and
squeeze profits rather badly. In addition, there is the worry that a drop
in volume of output would result in unit cost increases, another threat
to the existence of profits. Breakeven points have steadily risen. The
Westinghouse breakeven point is now three times v;hat it was in 1940 (l).
In the past, however, whenever corporations have been faced with
the problem of declining prices and lowered volume, they have managed to
reduce high operating ratios to fit the more competitive situation. At
present, business is undoubtedly showing the after-effects of war and boom
time when the problem was not the cost of obtaining material and labor, but
obtaining sufficient supplies at any price. Business is out of the habit of
counting the cost.
Nevertheless, testimony that business is still able to adapt it-
self to change in conditions is offered by the example of an American air-
line which under pressure to cut costs cut expenses by $400,000 a month.
Should any serious readjustment of boom conditions occur, it is probable
that other business under similar pressiire would be able to emulate the
example of T.W.A.
6. Inventories at Dangerously High Levels
The inflationary boom experienced throughout the economy in the
Jl] The Magazine of Wall Street . October 23, 1948, Page 102, states that
a recent study showed only 38 per cent of the companies covered could
make both ends meet even with 60 per cent of capacity operations. This
contrasts ?ath a total of 58 per cent who could breakeven at this level
in prewar years.
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postwar period, attended by steadily increased output, higher sales and
advancing prices, has encoiiraged the acc\imtilation of inventories at an
unprecedented rate. According to the Department of Conimerce (l), total
business inventories at the end of August reached a peak 5E.6 billion com-
pared with 46.4 billion a year earlier and only 26.4 billion at the begin-
ning of 1946. It is questionable, however, that this accumulation of in-
ventories represents a threat to economic stability.
It must be remembered that inventories are measured in dollars
and that the dollar has been steadily declining in value since 1946. There-
fore, we cannot by comparing the dollar inventories at the beginning of
1946 and mid 1948 say that inventories have grovm two an a half times in
physical quantity. It is only natural that inventories should be at record
dollar highs when the price of material and labor are measured by the
depreciated dollar. Astronomical as 52.6 billion of business inventories
may sean at the end of August, total business sales were around 55 billion,
thus indicating that inventories represented about six weeks sales. TaTiile
the noimal rate of turnover will vary greatlj?- between businesses, this
relationship between sales volume and inventories does not seem abnormal even
by prewar standards.
The National Securities and Research Corporation ( 2) reports that
new orders are at record highs, and large inventories are thus essential.
Aside from "some spotty situations" in industries where retailers have
TT) Chadwick, Nathaniel Stone, Fear Psychology from the Investor' s Stand-
point, Commercial and Financial Chronicle . Vol. 168, October 7, 1948,
Page 52.
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slackened off in buying from the manufacturer, the corporation finds no
evidence of any great overstocking of consumer or durable goods. In fact:
"There continues a great shortage of rayons, steel products,
houses, commercial biiildings, railroad equipment, and
automobiles, to say nothing of the continuing delay in
the biiilding of public improvements such as schools, high-
ways, etc. Moreover, in many industries large reserves
have been set aside for possible price declines.
"Therefore, it is our opinion that so long as it appears
that employment, national income, demands for foreign
aid and defense program are likely to be sustained over
the foreseeable fut\ire and new orders continue at high
levels, that inventories can comfortably continue at
record dollar value levels (l)."
This forecast was made in early October and nothing has occurred
in the last few months of 1948 to substantially change this outlook. A
slight falling off in consimer buying was noted before Christmas but pre-
Christmas sales and the last-minute rush resulted in new retail sales
records being set. With an increasing population available to absorb
inventory and the strong possibility'- that unions will block substantial
wage cuts, there seems little point in comparing the present situation to
the inventory losses of the early thirties.
7. Bank Credit May be Further Restricted
This fear of the investor shoxald be quieted by considering the
actions and policies of the money managers since the Federal Reserve under-
took its commitment to the Treasury in the late thirties to maintain an
(T) Chadwick, Nathaniel Stone, Fear Psychology from the Investor's Stand-
point, Commercial and Financial Chronicle , Vol. 163, October 7, 1948,
Page 52.
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orderly market for govermnent securities. The Treasury desired such a
policy (l) to enable the refunding of govei^innent securities at low rates
and (E) to protect the banks and insurance companies which are large
holders of government securities. The result of such support by the
Federal Reserve has prevented that body from exercisir:g its most effective
weapons against inflation and have prevented important restrictions of
bank credit.
While the money managers have attempted to tighten bank credit
through use of the several regulations under its control, these actions
have not had too much effect, acting more as an offsetting of credit made
available by the Federal Reserve. The increasing of bank reserves under a
recent act of Congress which forced the member banks to provide the Federal
Reserve Banks with an additional two billion dollars in reserves in
September merely soaked up the Federal Reserve credit made available to
the banks by Federal Reserve support purchases of government securities
through the Federal Reserve Open Market CoEEnittee. The banks continued to
increase their outstending loans after this operation and v/ere able to pay
off loans made from the Federal Reserve; thus, the banks appeared in better
condition after the action designed to decrease their reserves than before.
As the National City Bqnk of New York stated in its October Monthly
Letter (l):
"V/hen government bonds are purchased the Federal
Reserve Banks from member banks who are selling to
meet increased reserve requirements, the purchases
are not, in the algebra of monetary mechanics,
(1) Page 113
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• inflationary' . They only undo deflationary effects
that increases in reserve rec[uirenients v.-oiild other-
vjise have."
The rediscount rates of the Federal Reserve Banks were also
increased but have little effect v/hen the banks as a whole draw excess
reserves. Loaning regulations have also been tightened. Still there
measures cannot be expected to restrict credit to any great extent as long
as the Federal Reserve pursues a contradictory policy.
The Federal Reserve Banks still retain the power under the Act of
Congress passed in August, to raise reserve requirements another 2 per
cent, and in the case of the Reserve and Central Reserve City Banks 4 per
cent. Tills coupled vath higher rediscount rates might effectively restrain
credit available for bank loans providing bank and non-bank sales to the
Federal Reserve under its support program do not again offset to effect.
It also would appear that despite investor fears of restricted
bank credit it might have a salutory effect in view of the rising tide of
loans to business partly by banks but chiefly by insurance companies. A
sudden reversal in the ciirrent business situation might well find many
businesses saddled mth too heavy a debt b\irden. Perhaps a scaling down
of expansion plans and the paring of costs are more called for than
restricted bank credit.
8. Fourth Round of Y/a^^e Increases on Way
Statistics (l) supplied by the National Foremen's Institute
Jl) Boston Globe , Noveraber 16, 1948, Page 25, "Foranen' s Institute agrees
with Tobin on Fourth Round."
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give the follovang information as to the first three roimds of v;age in-
creases.
Rotind one— started at the end of 1945 in the automobile
industry; amomted to 18^- cants an hour; affected 53 million workers; and
came after the lifting of price controls.
Round tvjo— started in the spring of 1947 in the steel and auto-
mobile industries; amounted to around 11^ cents an ho\ir plus six paid
holidays which in many cases brought it up to 15 cents; affected 37 million
workers; was based on a cost of living increase of approximately 12 per
cent since October, 1945.
Round three— started in the spring and simmer of 1948 in the
textile industry; averaged about 12 cent an hour; affected 44 million vrorkers;
was based on an 11 per cent cost of living increase since April, 1947.
Labor has now initiated a campaign for a fourth round of v;age
increases v.lth the keynote appearing to be that since industry is making
record profits, labor is entitled to a fair share. A raise in v;ages, of
course, will increase production costs which previously have been passed on
to the consumer in the form of higher prices. With the consumer beginning
to evidence some opposition to the current level of prices, it is extremely
unlikely that a fourth round increase could be passed off on the consumer.
It would have to be absorbed in operating costs. This leads to a much
stiffer resistance on the part of management.
In fact there are a number of factors v/orking against any general
fourth round increase. Price competition is returning in consumer lines.
Pay increases woiild either cut profit margins or force economy in the use
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of labor management v/ovild favor the latter. This vraiild mean fewer jobs
for union labor, which idea is not relished by their leaders. Some
industries, textile, for example, are cutting production in the face of
lessened demand for their goods. Increased wages would only accelerate
the shutting down of these industries.
Now that business is not qiiite as good as it was in the previous
round, workers probably will be more reluctant to go out on strike since
jobs vjill be more difficult to get. Also a series of important strikes
could unfavorably impress Congress and bring stronger labor controls at a
tirae when the unions expect to be relieved of existing restrictions. In
addition, the cost of living index is shovang a slight decrease, and since
labor has tied its previous vrage danands to increases in that index, a
fourth round might be hard to justify.
Considering all these factors, it seems unlikly that there will
be any general or important v/age increases as long as the present outlook
remains unchanged. Hov;ever, the business situation coxold chanse vdthout
warning and the National Foremen* s Institute, a business research organi-
zation which forecast a fourth rormd ( in November, 1948) may be borne out
in their forecase by future events.
9 . Back LoD^ of Orders Caused by War Rapidly Declining
The three years of production from 1946—1948 have resulted in the
merchandise pipelines, virtually empty at the end of Ward War II, being
filled and in some cases the stocks of inventory have backed up on the
manufactuj?er bringing shutdowns to industries such as textile and shoe;
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scarcities, except for some Tnakes of autamobiles and probably steel, are
lai^ely a thing of the past. The seller must nov/ seek the buyer instead of
merely acting as an order taker. Profits are harder to make and not likely
to be as large as in 1948. In other words, the business situation looks
more nearly normal for 1949. Most business forecasts made in December, 1948,
predict that that postiivar situation of demand being greater than supply in
many lines will be reversed and adjustment will have to be made to supply
being greater than daaand at existing prices.
However, according to the National Securities and Research Corpo-
ration, the stock market in its low rates to appraised larger term earnings
of corporations has largely discounted the competitive that business is
aiming at. This relative position is arrived at now when the country is in
a prosperous active business condition and the momentim of such an econony
should carry on into the foreseeable future.
The majority of business forecasts feel that businessmen will have
more difficult going in 1949, but that the real test will not come until
1950. In 1949, the market will shift to a buyers market and business
failures are expected to increase. Hov/ever, consumer tendency to spend less
in the last v/eeks of 1948 is not viewed by official or private analysts as
serious. Retail trade volume usually reflects the level of personal income
and the amount of employment. Both income and employment according to the
forecast, are expected to raaain relatively high at least throijgh the first
half of 1949, so trade is expected to remain relatively active also.
10. High Rate of Production maj_ not b^
^
The rate of production, of course, depends on the strength of the
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demand for goods and the existence of adequate purchasing power. With fore-
casters predicting both income and employment to remain almost as high in
1949 as in 1948, it seems logical that production should be maintained at
a high rate in order to satisfy the demand created by the continiiing high
income and employment.
The National Seciirities and Research Corporation sees industrial
production being maintained at a high level because of tv.^o causes: (l) the
large domestic demand resulting from the momentum of a high peacetime level
of economy, and (2) the needs and demands from the rest of the v/orld. The
Research Corporation sees the prospects for some recovery in war devastated
areas and countries affected by the war but states that several years will
be needed before the great industrial nations—G-ennany, i'rance, Japan,
England—can satisfy their own domestic demands. Other war injured areas
such as the East Indies, China, Italy, Belgiinn, Holland, and Denmark will
continue their donand for United States production. In addition, there is
a continuing demand, v/hich the Research Corporation feels is likely to
continue on in.to the foreseeable future, from the rest of the world
especially South Anerica, Africa, Australia.
Exports of the country are expected to decline in 1949 from the
exceptionally high rate prevailing in 1946, 1947, and 1948, but also are
expected to exceed other peacetime levels. The Research Corporation states
its opinion that an appreciable decline in industrial opinion is not likely
in this foreseeable future, but that the postwar boom production is leveling
off.
Obviously the fears detailed in this section v/ill have a restrain-
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ing influence on security prices and, therefore, values are available in
securities which disco\mt the future to a great extent. Historically, v^hen
fears as to the future have overhung the securities market, the price level
of seciirities have presented an opportunity for advantageous investment,
particularly when research discloses a more optimistic outlook to be
possible. Sell selected and carefvLLly supervised investments made now vriLll
benefit both current income and long-term enhancement of value.
E. Government Policy and Inhibitions .Against Risk
!• The Goverrmient Discourages Risktaking
The crushing effect of the ineqiiities anbodied in the present tax
system has been advanced as one of the leading obstacles in the path of
Risk Capital. Fear and uncertainty as to the future events make confidence
about the future difficult. There is distrust of the financial machinery
although time and change have alleviated this handicap. High margin
restrictions exclude a substantial body of opinion from the market.
However, one of the most serious and insidious obstacles to the
raising of venture capital is the inhibition instilled in the people against
taking a risk. The i^erican economy was foimded and is based on individual
' action and individual risktaking. Yet, today the word "speculation" has
the connotation of evil. Our whole economic system vrauld collapse if
people ceased to speculate—take risks with their capital. Yet today, there
is a pyschological barrier which prevents a large number of our people from
taking risks.
A new generation has grown up since 1930 in an era highlighted by
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closed banks, idle factories, plowed-laider pigs, something-for-nothing
economics, NRA., WPA, PWA, and a host of other alphaheticaJL agencies.
Obviously, "free enterprise" and "individual action" have different mean-
ings to a people conditioned to government action. People are inclined to
look to the government for solutions of their problems more than ever
before in our history.
It is the proper sphere of government to maintain freedom and
safety, first for the individual and then for the state, to protect the
weak against the strong, to maintain and promote law and order.
Few will seriously challenge the duty of government to administer
a program which safeguards the individual by providing-through contributions
by the individual—a minimum income in his old age and protects his de-
pendents in case of untimely death, to offer some protection against unem-
ployment which is unavoidable in a dynamic and progressive economy.
Yet wlien government goes to such an extent in protecting the
individual that the individual is disinclined to give adequate thought to
his own welfare, preferring to place the burden in government, the government
is substituting paternalism for its real function and discouraging the
individualism on which the free enterprise system is fo-unded. When the
unemployment insurance systan is used for "paid vacations", as additional
income by individuals who work only long enough to establish rights to
benefits, or for "job hopping" the economy suffers. When a saving indi-
vidual finds that in time of emergency his self-denial and v.dllingness to
take riks to secure income leave him no better off than one who has lived
to the limit of his income in expectation of government aid, the saving of
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income and investment of ventiire capital is dealt a serious blow.
Fiirthermore, increased reliance on government means more com-
plicated government. The more complicated an economy becomes, the more
difficTJlt it is to understand and regiilate. It is interesting to note
that the far less disciplined economy of the United States has vathstood
the stress and strain of postv/ar reconstruction much better than the more
rigid systems of England and France. Inevitably, a more complicated govern-
ment becomes a bureaucratic government leading to heavy taxes based more
on social than revenue objectives and levied against the most productive
segments of the economy.
Risk taking in a business venture with the prospect of making a
profit has come to be suspect as a slightly illegal if not a manifestation
of greed. It appears that the prospect of security on someone else* s
payroll, particularly the government's, has far eclipsed the allure of
self-onployment mth the possible creation of nev/ jobs for others. A recent
survey (l) revealed this trend has developed to where 41 out of every 100
Americans prefer government jobs and security to private employment.
Already more than fifteen million Americans occupy government payrolls or
receive some type of government allotment. One out of every ten jobs in
the United States is currently supplied by the overdependence on the
"beneficence of bureaucracy" could well convert a nation of risktakers to
one peopled by "securocrats". Opinion studies cited by the President of
TT) ane^, Dewitt, President, National Small Businessmen's Association,
Who Killed Horatio Alger, Commercial and Financial Chronicle , Vol. 167,
Thursday, April 29, 1948, Pages 2, 40.
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the National Small Businessmen's Association (l) show already more people
in this country would rather work for the government than in socialist
England. By eliminating the former source of risk capital by heavy taxa-
tion and making "securocrats" of the remainder of the population, the
government eventually leave only itself as a source of risk capital. When
that point is reached free enterprise necessarily ceases to exist.
2. Are Margin Requirements too High
Since 1932, the Federal Reserve authorities have been empowered
to restrain the use of bank credit for speculation; they are required to
determine in the language of the act "whether tmdue use is being made of
bank credit for the speculative carrying of or trading in securities, real
estate, or commodities". Thus, the Federal Reserve Board is vested vdth
exclusive judgment as to what extent credit may be used to implement pro-
duction or expansion.
Since 1934, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve system
has also had the specific power to curb excessive use of credit for purchas-
ing or carrying secxirities by limiting the amount which holders of securities
may borrow upon them for the purpose either from banks or from securities
brokers and dealers. The amount is always less than the current market
value of the securities and the difference between the two is called the
margin. A 75 per cent margin means that a loan of i|2,500 is sectired by
stock with ^10,000.
(l) Emery, Dewitt, President, National Small Businessmen's Association,
Who Killed Horatio Alger, Cpmr-ierical and Financial Chronicle, Vol. 167,
Thursday, April 29, 194Q, Pages 2, 40.
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Prior to the v/ar, Reserve regiilations req^uired margins of 40 per
cent. In 1945, margins were increased to 50 per cent, then 75 per cent; in
1946, to 100 per cent; and in 1947, reduction was made to 75 per cent. Such
high requireanents are explained by the Federal Reserve as a curb on in-
flationary pressures. High maj^in requirements greatly reduce gains or
losses realized b3'- buying -with borrowed fimris and cut down the amount of
credit obtainable for this pu3?pose. In addition, pyramiding is restricted,
the extent that traders may add to their holdings when the market is rising
by borrowing against the additional market value of securities already held
in their accounts. The Federal Reserve believes that these measures which
restrain stock prices will eliminate the danger of a stock market boom
financed on credit and followed by a collapse.
Critics of the high margin policj'^ of the Federal Reserve have
pointed out that far from pursuing an inflationary cOTirse, the stock market
appears the only public market place unaffected by the inflationary tendencies
of our vatly expanded money supply. In mid 1948, the money supply was up
180 per cent over 1939, the Dow-Jones Index of commodity futures had risen
215 per cent since that time, with the cost of living up 125 per cent. How-
ever, Barron' s Index showed stock market price gains of only 33 per cent
frcm prewar levels. Stock prices have lagged despite a 110 per cent increase
in corporate earnings and 78 per cent increase in dividend payments.
Restraining stock prices results in an abundance of stock being sold at low
prices to meet currently inflated costs. Corporations thus could find them-
selves in a future business depression vath over extended capital structures.
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Then stocks ivill be even more abundant, and resultant price drops coxild
approximate the severity of 1929 (l).
While corporations in general during the extended depression
period needed no expansion because existing facilities were more than suf-
ficient to meet demand, the tremendous increase in postv/ar demand has led
to vast expansion programs which according to the McG-raw-Hill survey will
carry through 1953. The canvass showed that 300 large corporations anploy-
ing 25 per cent of the industrial workers in the country planned to spend
only 5 per cent less in 1949 than in 1948, a year of record-breaking
expenditures. These companies spent ^^15 billion in 1948.
To obtain the needed funds, industry must resort to bank borrow-
ing. Equity funds are very difficult to secTire due to limitation of life
insiirance companies and savings banks to bonds, and the limitation of public
funds by prevailing high income taxes, double taxation of dividends, and
reluctance of lower income groups to invest in stocks. Twenty-one important
manufacturing companies recorded an increase in debt from 37 per cent in the
case of Union Oil of California to 60 per cent in Electric Auto-lite; from
none in Dow Chemical and Union Carbide and Carbon to approximately 50 per
cent of total capital, excluding surplus. Monsanto Chemical, a company of
great financial strength, in 1948 had to postpone an issue of preferred stock
and substitute a line of bank credit.
Furthemore, bank borroiving is inflationary. A company which goes
to a bank for its financial needs creates new deposits and, therefore, new
(l) Witherspoon, William, Margin and Credit Restrictions, C^onrnerical and
Financial Chronicle
.
Vol. 168, Thursday, July 15, 1948, Page 3.
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money; financing from public sources on the other hand is supplied by
expendable money or savings and is, therefore, not inflationary. The
Federal Reserve system by disco\iraging the purchase of equity securities
which would improve stock market prospects is actually promoting, not
restraining inflation.
Of major importance is the eventual effect of large volume borrow-
ing. The effect of the 1932 depression on railroads which borrowed exces-
sively in the twenties is well remembered. Bank loans which rose to $58
billion in 1947 and are estimated to exceed $45 billion in 1948 could cause
a repetition of the 1932 debacle which would not be confined to the rail-
roads. At the same time, it appears inconsistent for the Federal Reserve
to deny banks the right to make loans to responsible stock investors which
would result in companies obtaining funds for expansion through stocks sales
instead of borrowing directly from the banks.
One economist (l) illustrates that if a 50 per cent mai^in is
raised by 50 per cent and thus made 75 per cent, as is now true, the amovmt
required as mai^in is tripled. In other words, a 50 per cent margin in equal
to the amount loaned
—
$5,000 to $5,000 is one to one. On a 75 per cent
margin, the amount is three times that loaned
—$7,500 paid by the purchaser
to $2,500 advanced by the banker. It is emphasized that no pledge, collateral,
loan, or mortgage requires 300 per cent protection to the amount loaned,
particularly of a pledge that is readily marketable.
Til Prince, Theodore, LL.M. , Who Killed Cock Robin, Commercial and
Financial Chronicle . Vol. 167, Thursday, April 1, 1948, Page 24.
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3. The Wall Street Myth
The public generally appears to have a confused and distorted
idea of what Vi'all Street is and what it accomplishes. V/all Street "public
relations" which have never been of the best have been worsened over the
years by attacks made by irresponsible or miinfonned public figures. For
example, an ex-mayor of New York (l) in 1947 stated:
"Assuming that the Stock Exchange closes and (all commodity
excharj^es) it v:ould not make one bit of difference to
the industries and businesses of the coimtry."
"There v/ould be just as many automobiles m.anufactured
and v;ould not be one less pound of steel produced, there
would not be one less pound of v/heat grovm or sovm, it
vrould show hov/ artificial this speculating, gambling,
business isl"
The President of the United States in his conduct of the 1948
political campaign did nothing to take away from this idea, but on the
contrary advanced the small tovn concept of V/all Street as a den of iniquity
popiilated by selfish conniving schemers interested only in lining their
pockets mth fat profits. It is not surprising that the average individual
having been propagandized mth countless charges against Wall Street, has
tended to acquire the view that investment brokers personify the cartoonists'
caricatiires
—
paunchy silk-hatted tycoons surrounded by money bags.
Independent and impartial public opinion surveys made in 1947
discovered that more than one-third of the public still believe that a hand-
ful of capitalists, such as Dupont, Morgan, and Rockefeller, o\m America*
s
bip: corporations. Almost one-half the people do not believe the figures
(T) "Laguardia says strikes closing exchanges would be good thing",
Comrr:ercial ejid. Financi al Chronicle, Vol. 167, Thursday, April 4, 1947,
Page 4.
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contained in the annual reports made by corporations, or suspect their
accuracy even vihen certified by independent auditors. It may be concluded
that on the whole, Wall Street does not enjoy the confidence of the public.
What is Wall Street, what fxmctions does it perform, and of v/hat
value has it been to the American economy?
Wall Street is composed of investment bankers, brokers, and
dealers, managers, buyers, salesmen, and clerical help. The members of the
two Nev; York exchanges which constitute Wall Street, (the New York Stock
Exchange and the New York Curb Exchange) transact about 90 per cent of the
total stock exchange business of this country. The essential functions of
the stock exchange are three fold:
1. To furnish a market place to which anyone who desires
to buy or sell a stock admitted to trading on the
exchange can go, or send his order. Because exch??nge
facilities permit a large concentration of orders to
buy Q-r sell, their second function has evolved, namely:
2. To furnish a major pricing mechanism in our economy,
because 1,397 different issues of stock are dealt in
on the New York Exchange and 836 different issues are
listed on the Nevj York Curb Exchange, Wall Street
provides a continuous appraisal of the value of shares
in a major cross- section of American business.
3. The stock market reveals the attitude of thousands of
people who may have capital to invest. Business v^hich
is seeking new funds is enabled to knov/ whether investors
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"Will run the risks of uncertain income and possible
loss of capital in hope, or whether they prefer
relatively safe securities at a fixed income. The
stock market has been compared to a giant public
opinion poll with the difference that everyone
expressing an opinion in the poll must back it up
with purchases or sales of securities.
Wall Street has been of far more importance in developing the
American economy than is generally realized. Through its vital function of
furnishing a market place wherein the seekers and providers of capital may
come together, many American companies and industries which today provide
employment for millions and add materially to our standard of living have
grown from speculative vent\ires to become mainstays of the economy. It may
be pointed out in connection with the present lack of venture capital that
if the stock markets and investing had been throttled and restricted by
governmental regulation at the time when the United States was expanding
across the American Continent, it is doubtful that people vrauld have cared to
invest in the railroad systems which have \inified the country and made the
people and products of one region accessible to all regions of the country.
Many undoubtedly took losses on their railroad investments, but the end
result was a great gain for the economy.
Much abuse has been heaped on Wall Street for providing fmds for
speculative ventvires, but v.lthin our lifetime the radio, automobile, and
airplane industries have grown up to maturity. The automobile industry alone
has developed from a novelty to one of the largest industries employing

125
Why a Shortage of Risk Capital
directly and indirectly millions of workers. Capital has been lost in
developing these companies, but as in the case of the railroads, the net
result was a gain for the economy and an increase in the standard of living.
In addition to financing new ventures, the Stock markets aid those
concerns with a fiduciary responsibility to place their funds in conserva-
tive high goods investments. Thus, life insurance companies and banks are
enabled to put their funds into productive and comparatively riskless use;
large industries are enabled to become more productive and efficient,
increasing the standard of living.
V/all Street still suffers from the bad reputation it gained during
the twenties when insufficient infonnation was available and insiders were
able to take advantage of the investor by various devices. The stock
exchanges themselves have done much to eliminate sharp practices, and in
addition, Federal laws (l) strictly enforced by the Securities Exchange
Commission require fvll disclosure and prohibit questionable devices.
Nevertheless, while the investor is entitled to full disclosure of in-
formation, Government action which reduces the incentive to risk-taking
ignores the fact that our economy was built by risk-taking. This is
especially important in view of the redistribution of income which has been
going on for the past two decades due to the New Deal taxation programs.
Individuals who might have taken a productive risk by purchasing securities,
wagered a total of 3.3 billions in parimutual betting alone in 1947 and
1948, in the twenty-one states where horse race betting is legal.
(1) The Sec\irities Exchange Act of 1954 contains no suggestion that the
stock exchanges do not serve a useful and necessary purpose.

126
Wliy a Shortage of Risk Capital
While the pop\alar opinion is held that only a few v;ealthy men
control American industry, the facts are otherwise. It is variously esti-
mated that froiii five to eighteen million individuals owi securities in the
United States. Life insurance companies purchased 40 per cent of the
securities offered in 1948, giving additional millions (policy and stock-
holders) a direct and financial interest in the welfare of the industrial
economy.
It would be desirable for V/all Street not only to refute demagogic
charges, but spread accurate information. The Nev/ York Stock Exchange has
conducted an advertising program in national magazines and newspapers, but
more needs to be done. It is suggested (l) that corporation annual reviews
and reports be v/ritten up in language more understandable to the layman,
that corporate publications "sell the story of finance" and that Wall Street
make more effort to sectire the goodwill of the American public. The
President of the New York Curb Exchange has stated:
"Until the revival of confidence that we are a growing
nation with work to be done and profits to be made,
until the resxirgence of the speculative spirit, the
willingness to calculate the chances of profit and
the dangers of loss of our venture capital, interest
in stock market speculation vall not revive and the
movement of venture capital will be held up ." (2).
4. The Myth of High Corporate Profits
Department of Commerce reports show corporate profits in the third
(l) Leif
,
Lawrence, Wall Street should take the offensive, Commerical and
Financial Chronicle, Vol. 167, Thursday, June 3, 1948, Pa^^e 23.
(2) Truslow, Francis Adams, Stock Market Specvilation and Venture Capital,
Commercial and Financial Chronicle, Vol. 167, Thursday, February 5,
1948, Page 25.
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quarter of 1948 running at an annual rate of 21.7 billions. This constitutes
a new record level and compares with ;grevious peaks of 18.1 billions in
1947, 12.8 billions in 1946, and 8^4 billions in 1929 (l). The fact that
corporate profits reached an all-time high have furnished nevi ammunition
to those groups—in and out of government—who constantly maintain that
such earnings are fantastically excessive and should be drained off via
higher wages, higher taxes, or lov;er prices.
This poses a serious problem for all industry; for people in
general believe that high profits represent extra dollars in the bank. In
addition, continuous propaganda has succeeded in convincing very many people
that high profits are bad and that they are obtained only through 'gouging
the public". Over the past years, segments of the government and various
pressure groups have maintained a relentless attack on -American business
and our economic system.
Efficient operation of industry is hampered on all sides by
restrictive r\ales and regulations, and the threat of additional rules and
regiilations have undermined the incentive to expand and produce. Powerful
forces are at work vdthin as well as outside the government whose program,
whether they realize it or not, will eventually lead to socialization of
industry.
Industry has been subjected to continuous charges often having
little basis in economic or legal fact. Recently it has been charged that
(ll Third Quarter Corporate Profits and National Income, "Survey of
Current Business", December, 1948, Page 7.
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because some oil cQmpanies are integrated—this is, engaged in production,
transportation, refining, and marketing—it tends to create a monopoly.
In fact that there are more than 150 companies integrated in this sense,
many engaged in direct competition i*/ith one another, is ignored. Di-sregarded
also is the existence of 34,000 companies competing; in every phase of the
business. Such charges, whether justified or not, have the result of con-
tinually putting industry/ in a bad light. People come to believe that
"big" in synonymous vath "bad"; that industrial success is a crime. The
fact that corporations report record profits seems to clinch the argiiment
and justify further restrictions of industry.
The importajice that business profits assume in the public mind was
emphasized by the setting up of a Senate-House Joint Committee which held
hearings in December, 1948, to investigate the subject. In testimoney
before the committee, the representatives of industry made four principal
points which v^ere upheld by a majority of the nation's economists and
accountants.
1. Profits as currently reported include a substantial
element of inventory gains. Except from the arbitrary
standpoint of accounting terminology, , these sums are not
true profits (although taxed as such) for inventories
must be kept on hand continuously if the business is to
continue in operation. Industry is in a position similar
to that of an individual who sells a house for #10,000
which cost $5,000. The "profit" is ^^5,000, but the
entire §10,000 must be paid out for a comparable house.
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2. Profits, as computed under the standard accounting
procedures, are overstated due to the fact that
depreciation charges, based on original cost, are
today inadequate. An asset costing t^50,000 in 1958
and estimated to have a ten-year life -will be
depreciated at the rate of $5,000 a year. But the
sums set aside for replacement are inadequate if the
asset costs |100,000 or more as is likely under 1948
conditions.
3. The increase in dollar profits appears to be the result
not of wider profit margins but of a tremendous expansion
in sales volume. A moderate do^mtum in revenues or
increase in expenses would find business vulnerable, for
industry ivould be unable to offset high labor and material
costs with a high volume of output, thus keeping dovm unit
costs.
4. The pxirchasing power of the corporation dollar has declined
exactly as has that of the individual* s dollar. Corporation
profit dollars won* t buy any more than the individual* s
income dollars. The National City Bark of New York estimates
the 1948 total national income at 218 billions of which
61 per cent went to employees incomes; 9.1 per cent con-
stituted corporation profit after taxes. The same source
shows employees received 58.1 per cent of a total nat\rral
income of 87.4 billions in 1929, and corporations, after
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taxes, receiyed 9.6 per cent. Even the C I. 0.
concludes that "the treaaendous profit increases
in the past two years have coincided with the price
inflation and resulted from the inflation", (l)
Labor* s protagonits at the congressional hearings presented argu-
ments intended to offset the points offered by industry. Nevertheless, the
follOTving conclusions (2) appear justified. First, that all business,
regardless of size or accounting methods, is troubled by the high cost of
living to the same extent as the individual. Second, that profits have
gone not to the wealthy few, but to many shareholders (3) in dividend
dollars low in piirchasing power and subject to steep personal income taxes.
Furthermore, while more dollars were distributed than ever before, dividends,
constituted only 3.3 per cent of the total national income as compared ulth
6.6 per cent in 1929 (4). Third, the most important, the great bulk of
these profits have been "plowed back" to increase production—the only
method by which increased demand can be met and living standards raised.
Profits in our industry attract competitors, resulting in lower prices and
or better quality of product. Not only did the record profits of 1948
Til C. I. 0»s 1948 Wage Case, C. I. 0. Economic Outlook , Vol. 9, Februaiy,
1948, Page 1.
( 2) Congress Hearings on Profits, Monthly Lett e^, National City Bank of
New York, January, 1947, Page 7.
(3) The National City Bank of New York economists estimate their nmber
at 15 millions.
T4J Gold" Rush, 1948, Monthly Letter . National City Bank of New York,
November, 1948, Page 127.
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encourage expansion of industry, but they provided a large part of the money
required.
The profits which have furnished the incentive for industry to
grow large and become efficient has also enabled these companies to provide
goods and services to the American people in quantities and at prices
unequalled elsewhere in the world. No form of stateism has ever come near
to achieving a standard of living comparable to that enjoyed in the United
States.
Hovj-ever, if the incentive to do a better job of serving the public
is destroyed, if large efficient units are penalized simply because they
are efficient, the xvay is paved for a planned economy similar to that which
has had such disastrous results in other nations of the v;orld. In 1949,
the steel industry v/as condemned for making profits and at the same time
urged to undertake expensive expansion. If government in the case of steel,
or any other industry, succeeds in making expansion out of profits
impossible, the left-wing planners will be advanced in their arguments for
the socialization of industry.
The \iltimate decision as to the course of this coimtry rests with
the people. Unfortunately, their sources of infoimation—the government
through its many agencies being a major source—have stressed the economic
fallacies; the economic facts are less well-knovm.
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Conclusion
A» Revise Taxes and Depreciation Rates
The year 1949 opened ulth a call for hifjher taxes for corporations
and the upper-income brackets by the President of the United States. Many
thouahtful individuals in and out of the financial v»rorld fear that there
is danger of killing the goose which lays the golden eggs. Government
—
Federal, state, and local—now takes about 27 per cent of the national
income; 54 billions of dollars in 1948. Past experience has shown that
whenever taxes absorb more than 25 per cent of the national income over a
period, the strain on the economy is so great as to result in changes in
government (l).
The United States v/hich has long believed in mass production prices
that ever growing mass markets can pay, should apply the same principal to
taxes. It has long been considered poor business and worse economics to
charge all the market will bear, because such a policy kills markets. It
is possible that business prosperity and national prosperity vdll be ended
by a crushing tax burden which denies business the capital it must have to
meet the demands of an ever increasing popxilation seeking a higher standard
of living (2).
Certain it is that savings available for investment are declining.
New equity and risk-taking money is harder than ever to obtain and the
(1) The C3nicial Test of i'ederal Finance, New England Lett er. First
National Bank of Boston, December 3, 1948.
Jz] TGI,1» s Column, Boston Globe
.
Wednesday, December 8, 1948, Page 33.
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expansion and improvement of the industrial machine has been more and more
difficult to finance. More and more goods are necessary to supply Europe
and at the same time maintain the American standard of living. To
accomplish this goal more and better machines are needed to enable more
efficient production.
In order to finance new productive capacity, it must be made
possible for the people who in the past have been the chief source of equity
capital to save more money for investment and feel that they can afford to
take reasonable risks in making investments. Inequities in the tax structxire
of which double taxation is the most glaring should be eliminated to the
greatest extent possible. Business should be allowed sufficient depre-
ciation reserves, deductable from taxes, to replace equipment at 1948 costs.
Taxes levied on arbitrary basis of questionable equity such as the excess
profits tax should be avoided.
The followiiig suggestions apply to the various sections of the tax
structure considered under inequities of the tax structure:
1 . Reduce Personal Income Taxes
The financial needs of the community cannot be supplied entirely
by internal sources and borrovdng. The former is limited by retainable
earnings; the latter by the equity in the business. The financial structure
should be liberally bolstered mth risk capital. Historically, as shovm,
the upper-bracket incomes (over §25,000) have provided this risk capital.
However, the high progressive tax structure which took as much as 91 per cent
of income during the vreir years have practicell:/ dried up the source of savings
which go into common stocks.
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A recer.t study (l) shovrs the erosion of these incomes. In
1916, 40,000 individuals had a pretax income of $25,000 or more and retained
3.2 billion after taxes. In 1929, 103,000 vjere in this group and retained
7.3 hillion. In 1942, only 92,000 v/ere in this group and retained but 2.2
billion. The national incomes in those three years stood at 45 billion in
1916, 85 billion in 1929, and 122 billion in 1942. Thus, the pool of
savings available for risking has shi*unk both quantitatively and qualita-
tively. The group of millionaires retained after taxes §400 million in
1946, $1,000 million in 1929, and |21 million in 1942. The study shows
that for every dollar available for risking in 1942, $20 were available in
1916 and §50, in 1929.
The political pressure for steeply progressive taxes appears due
to the belief that the lower-incom.e groups are gre&tlj benefited by the
resulting redistribution of income. Actually, the total income received by
the high income groups is too small to affect lovv-er level income greatly or
governmental revenue under any tax system (2),
The Treasury Department preliminary report for 1945 ( 3) shows
individual income above the $25,000 level—the excess after allowing
$25,000 for each taxpayer receiving more than that amount—equalled 3.27 per
cent of total individual incoro.e reported by those filing Federal incom-e in
the United States, and 2.15 per cent of the national income. These per-
( l) Lawrence, Joseph Stagp,, Capital Markets and National D efehs e
.
Baiikinp: ,
Vol. 40, April, 1948, Pages 97-98.
T2I Hold Reduced Tax on High Incomes Benefits All, Comsnercial _and Financial
Chroncile
.
Vol. 167, Thursday, Mav 6, 1948, Page 28.'
T3) Ibid.
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centages v/ould appear to indicate that income is not, as popularly believed,
concentrated in the hands of a few upper-bracket families v«'ho might v/ith
justice be expected to cariy the major part of the tax burden.
Nevertheless, v/hile these incomes cannot carry the whole tax
burden, they have historically provided the risk-talcing capital for
industrial advancement (l). The importance of this function to people of
all income classes is not appreciated by those in the lower income groups.
If it were generally understood by the lower income individual that he owes
his higher standard of living largely to the great increase in worker pro-
ductivity since 1900, and that this increased productivity is due to the
existence of expensive industrial equipment—valued at from ^^7,000, Cr9,000
per Tjorker
—
provided in great part by the upper-bracket individual out of
income not paid out in taxes, there might not be so mdespread acquiescence
in the so-called "soak the rich" philosophy. The level of real v/ages
throijghout our history has closely paralleled the average amount of capital
investment per wage-earner. Therefore, improvement in economic position
would be further advanced by lower instead of higher personal income taxes.
Figures have been advanced to show that the Treasury TTOiild have
lost only one-half of one per cent of total receipts, had the effective levy
of 50 per cent (2), and that the Treasury would have lost only 2.2 per cent
(1) A Federal Reserve Survey has determined that savings are more concen-
trated than income and that the top 10 per cent of the spending xrnits
held over one-half of personal liqxiid assets. 1948 Sxirvey of Consumer
Finances, Federal Reserve Bulletin , Vol. 34, August 1948, Pages 914-932.
(2) "Holds Reduced Tax on High Incomes Benefits All", Commercial and Financial
Chronicle, Vol. 167, Thursday, May 6, 1948, Page 28.
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of total revenue in 1947 (or 850 million dollars) had the 50 per cent rate
prevailed in that year (l). Internal revenue spokeanen are reported as
placing tax evasions at over 4 billion a year (2).
The high personal income tax is considered as one of the chief
obstacles to risk-taMng investment. It ii'X)uld seem on the basis of equity
alone that government should not deprive any individual of more than one-
half of his income. (Various polls have indicated the public feels like-
vdse.) If the foregoing figures are even approximately correct, it v/ould
seem not only eqxiitable, but sound business to adopt a 50 per cent maximum
tax. The Treasury's loss would only be one-q.uarter of what is now lost
through evasion, and wt5iild be more than offset by the strengthening of the
economy, since it is reasonable to suppose that the beneficiaries of the
reduction v;ould resume their historicsl role of the risktaker and investor.
Many v.Titers on tliis subject question that the Treasury'" v.-ould lose revenue
and predict that a broadened tax base v/ould bring greater tax collections (s).
Particularly vrould this be true if comnion stocks paying 8 or 9 per cent
coxild bring the upper-bracket investor a better return than a 1 per cent
tax-exempt municipal bond.
(1) Courts, Richard W., Must Have Risk Capital or Goverment Ov.Tierslaip of
Industiy, Commercial and Financia3. Chronicle , Vol. 167, Thursday,
March 18, 1948, Page 34.
(2) Ibid ."
(3) Lower tax rates would alloxr the class to put its monej- to vrork pro-
ductively and the resultant greater income would return greater revenue
to government. Laxvrence, Joseph Stagg, Capital Markets and National
Defense, Banking , Vol. 40, April, 1948, Pages 97-98.

J.37
Conclusion
Adoption of this tax reform ivould restore the individual investor
to a measure of his fornier importance as a supplier of risk-taking investment
capital and reduce the pressure generated by the lack of this capital for
insurance companies and government to assume this role.
2. Reduce or Revise Capital G-ains Tax
The capital gains tax has been foujid nearly useless in the pro-
duction of revenue. England and Canada have never had one. It discourages
buying and selling even T;hen, mthout such a tax, buj'-ir^ or selling would
be very beneficial. Such discouragement is reflected in reduced market
activity, lessening therefore marketability which tends to reduce values
which lessens the incentive to invest in equities. The exclusion of capital
gains from the income tax base should encourage risk investments, thereby
increasing the pool of venture capital, should make for greater liquidity
in the security markets, and should result in greater stability in Federal
tax revenues.
If it is considered politically inexpedient to abolish this tax,
at least the taxpayer should be allov;ed to offset his capital losses against
capital gains. It does not seem conducive to risk-taking when the taxpayer
realizes that while a large proportion of his gain mil go to the government,
he vdll be allov/ed to offset against his ordinary income only |;i,000 of his
losses. Losses are an extronelj'- important element in the psychology of risk-
taking. A taxpayer's mllingness to take risks will vathstand high tax rates
on his gains if he is assured of parity treatment for his losses.
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3. Eliminate Double Taxation of Dividends
It should be recognized that the stockholder ajnd the corporation
are one, and that dividends are a part of profits. Dividends and profits
are part and whole, representing enterprise and equity investment. There-
fore, taxes on corporation net income should be collected at the source
and in one operation. A single tax v/ould have the result of reducing
collection costs and loss through evasion. Furthemore, it vrauld eliminate
the present illogic of taxing the same thing tvace. The resulting loss in
revenue as in practically every case here considered would be made up by
broaderJ.ng the tax base. The increased net earnings and investment result-
ing from the lifting of the double taxation burden v^jould swell the govern-
ment* s receipts from income taxes (l). A fxirther desirable adjustment of
the teix lav/s in regard to dividends wuld be the equlization of dividends
and bond interest charges. At present, taxes are paid on the earnings from
which dividends are paid v/hile interest charges are deductable as operating
expenses, thus militating against sound business procedures and favoring
excessive debt issues.
4. Avoid an Excess Profits Tax in Peacetime
The excess profits tax while justified in wartime is a particxiLarly
xmdesirable peacetime tax because of the extreme difficulty of setting an
equitable base (2). It woiold particularly penalize the corporation which
(1) Haney, Lewis H. , Double Taxation, Investrnent, and Enterprise, Commercial
and Financial Chronicle . Vol. 164, Thursday, February 3, 1949, Page 24.
( 2) Two difficult questions must be met if such a tax is to be applied mth
fairness: (1) YHiat is a reasonable retiim? (2) What constitutes capital
value?
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has been alert to adopt new measures and increase output to meet postv.far
dauand (l). It iTOnld be especially haimful to heavy industry, the "feast
and famine" industry. It would favor the companies which have sat "fat,
dumb, and happy" throijgh the upheavals of the past decade (2).
Such a tax would apply an inevitable brake to employment and
production as well as encouraging wasteful expenditure (3), penalizing
initiative and enterprise, and discouraging nev; ventures. In a peacetime
economy, it would interfere with the function of profits which is to guide
the flow of investment. The evils of such a tax are so obvious that it is
doubtful that a peacetime Congress will re-enact it.
Harold M. Groves, an authority in the field of Public Finance,
analyses this tax in respect to its chief peacetime objective, monopoly
control, in the following manner:
"The principal objective of a peacetime excess profits
tax is to recapture monopoly gains. A major difficulty is to
isolate such gains. In practice, to tax monopoly profits
may mean that efficiency and risk profits will also be
singled out for special taxation along v.lth monopoly rewards.
A return of 10 per cent on invested capital may be excessive
in the case of a concern vdth a steady income, small risk,
and medicore management, but is this true in the case of a
company (perhaps a mining concern) with a highly fluctuating
income, a high risk factor, and very superior managoaent?"
(l) Most plans for this tax contaaplate setting a base period, usually
in the thirties, with which present earnings wovild be compared.
Jz] Dezendorf
,
Tranklyn B., Excess Profits Tax, Barron* s Weekly , Vol. 28,
November 29, 1948, Pages 5-6.
(3) The common illustration is that of wartime advertising campaigns at
government expense since the money thus spent Vi/ould have otherwise
been taxed away.
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"An excess profits tax is in no sense a regulatory and
preventive measure like public utility rate control
and the renegotiation of contracts. We cannot even
be certain that the 'recapture of monopoly profits*
vdll be at the ezpense of the monopolist rather than
the consumer. Preventive measures for monopoly that
might further be developed include the regxilation of
the corporate institution, business practices, and
combinations. In extreme cases, monopoly may warrant
price control or public ovmership. Monopoly profits
can be taxed in the hands of individuals as well as
those of corporations." (l)
It may be concluded from the foregoing that while monopoly control
is earnestly to be desired, other and more eg.\iitable methods are at the
disposal of the authorities than this "crude and undiscriminating" control.
5. More Liberal Depre|ciation Schedules
Some businessmen are reported as stating that a favorable change
in depreciation schedules would be more valuable than a sizeable tax cut.
The Council of Economic Advisers are also reported as favoring a change to
accelerated depreciation. Theoretically, accelerated depreciation will not
necessarily reduce corporate taxes. The total charges against income are
the same regardless of the period over which they are spread. A company xvith
stable income would obtain no particular tax benefit. However, difficulties
in raising funds for necessary plant and equipment expansion throw a
different light on the problom. Difficidty in raising funds from external
sources force more dependence on internal sources—depreciations, reserves,
and undistributed profits. Accelerated depreciation would allow companies
to bxiild up funds faster during the first years after nev^ equipment is placed
TTJ Groves , Harold M. , Financing Government . Henry Holt and Company,
New York, 1945, Page 195.
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in operation, greatly aiding in financing the purchaser (l).
In addition, within reasonable limits, corporate management
should be held less strictly to Treasury depreciation schedules. This change
woiild encourage management to adopt scientific and progressive eq.uipment
policies and replace existing machines before absolescance. A djuamic
equipment policy could be evolved.
Insufficient attention has been devoted to the economic effect of
depreciation schedules allowed the corporation in considering corporate tax
legislation. Many reason that the unprogressive character of British plant
and eouipment is due to the fact that permitted and annual rates of
depreciation have been too low. Sweden on the other hand permits rapid
depreciation and its industry has followed a dynamic equipment policy.
B_. Allovj Insurance Companie s to Take I^quities
The evidence shov7S that as the restrictions on investment
practicies of the insurance companies have led to a dearth of investment
opportxinities, there has been a tendency on the part of the state legis-
latures to liberalize the statutes to enable ins\irance company utilization
of hitherto forbidden outlets for their funds.
Insurance company activity in the field of rental housing and in
the ownership of business properties may be taken as examples of this trend.
In 1938, the New York Insurance law was revised to allow life insurance
companies direct investment in low-rental housing, and similar legislation
(1) Quick Depreciation: Tax Relief for the 1950* s. Business Y/eek, Vol. 29,
February 5, 1949, Page 21.
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was enacted in other states. In 1948, rental housing for approximately
200,000 persons representing an investment of over ^400 million was either
completed or planned under this program (l). Companies which have gone
into housing on a lai^e scale include Metropolitan Life, Prudential (2),
New York Life, Equitable, and the John Hancock Life Ins\jrance Companies.
Until 1948, real estate investment had not been an important use
of insurance funds except for company-used and foreclosed property which
later had to be disposed of mthin a given period. Since 1942, most states
have enacted lav/s allowing direct purchase and holding of real estate. By
December, 1948, thirty-nine states permitted such investments and life
insurance companies held real estate valued at more than one billion
dollars (3). Over half of this amount was represented by commercial
rather than residential properties which the insurance companies buy or
build, and lease at a net rental, allowing a fair return on the f\mds
invested and complete repayment during a reasonable period of years.
These types of investments are a step in the right direction since
capital is made available without a corresponding increase in the capital
indebtedness. These projects are being viewed with much interest as a new
(l) Harrison, G-eorge L., Life Insurance Companies and Equity Financing,
Commercial and Financial Chronicle . Vol. 167, Thursday, April 22,
1948, Page 26.
T2I However on January 2, 1949, Prudential announced it would build no
more low-rental profits under present cost conditions.
(3) Van Schaich, E. L. , "Insurance Investments and Economic Stability",
Editorial Research Reports, No. 3, Vol. 1, Januaj^ 19, 1949, Page 53.
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fom of equity financing, but at present represent but a small proportion
of total insurance company investments. By the end of 1948, direct real
estate holdings were only 1.9 per cent of the total assets and state laws
regulate the proportion of any company* s assets so invested (l).
In addition, the forgoing investments appear to have definite
limitations other than legal. The most important and most usual form of
corporate equity financing is through common stocks.
It has been shown that amendment to the restrictions on investment
practices in the cases of rental housing and the holding of real estate
were accomplished by the states without haimful affects on the stability of
the insurance structure. It woiild appear that state laws could likewise be
liberalized so as to permit the holding of coirnnon stock vdthout haimful
results.
A trend of this nature has developed since World T/ar II. Limited
common stock investments are now peimitted in thirty states, including New
Jersey, Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania. Wisconsin and Ohio
liberalized their laws in 1947. Over 46 per cent of all life insurance
assets are owned by companies domiciled in these six states. But New York
where 40 per cent of all such assets are domiciled absolutely prohibits
common stock purchase (2). It is significant to note that Canadian life
insurance companies may place up to 15 per cent of their assets in common
stocks, while English laws contain no. restrictions on life insurance purchase
(1) Van Schaich, F. L., "Insurance Investments and Economic Stability",
Editorial Research Reports, No. 3, Vol. 1, January 19, 1949, Page 53.
(2) Harrison, George L. , "Life Insurance Companies and Equity Financing",
Cammercial and Financial Chronicle , Vol. 167, Thursday, April 22, 1948,
Page 26.
~

144
Conclusion
of common stocks.
It was previously noted that life insiirance companies have not
generally taken full advantage of such common stock investment as is allowed
them due to the traditional conservatism of the industry, and that such
investments would have definite investment benefits for the industry. It
may be pointed out now that there are definite political benefits as well.
The T.N.E.C. study (l) of the industry made prior to World War
II noted that the life insurance companies were in effect sterilizing the
savings received and preventing their entry into new business or risky
enterprises. The study concluded: (2)
Unless the life insurance companies can find methods
by which the funds under their control mil become
available as eqiuty for the stimulation of new enter-
prises and accessible to the small and medium-size
businessman, and by which investments in common stock
will become more prevalent in order that industrial
enterprise may not become overburdened ivith debt,
consideration will have to be given to the extent to
which the insurance companies may longer monopolize
and dictate the direction of the flovj of the savings
of the people."
Should the same conclusion be reached by post-war Federal investi-
gations of the industry which are espected to be undertaken by the Eighty-
first Congress, Federal regulation might force Investments of the type
frowned upon by insurance executives.
As has been pointed out there are advantages and disadvantages to
the ownership of common stocks by life insurance companies. However, it
(1) "Va^chaich , F. L. , Insurance Investments and Economic Stability,
Editorial Research Reports, No. 3, Vol. 1, January 19, 1949, i'age 57.
(2) "fbl'd.
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vrauld seem that the Isirge life companies have investment managers astute
and experienced enough to make the most of the advantages and avoid the
disadvantages. The very sizeable loans greated to certain corporations
would indicate strong confidence in the well-sustained earning capacity of
these enterprises.
The venture capital problem is serious. The C.E.D. (l) points
out that the shortage involves two dangers; the slowing of economic pro-
gress and an excessive debt burden which is conducive to depression. A
more preferable solution from an overall vievrooint vroiiLd be the restoring
of conditions stimialating the flow of risk capital by individual investors.
Since this would entail the tax reforms suggested elsewhere, in this
section, such a solution to the problem is not likely in the near future.
The life insurance industry remains the most likely source of the required
venture capital.
C. Rivise Q-ovemment Policies
Grovemment policies since 1932 seem to have been based on the
premise that profit-taking is inherently evil and should be diminished and
controlled by government sponsored legislation, and that Government should
devote itself to the welfare of the people as sometMng separate from the
v/elfare of the economy as a whole. Certain of the legislation passed on
this premise has bean for the good of the people as a whole; much more has
actually been inimical to the best interests of not only the people as a
Til "Monetary and Fincal Policy for G-reater Economic Stability" . Committee
for Economic Development, December 1948, Page 9.
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whole but the group it was intended to protect (l). In considering the
problems of obtaining risk capital the conclusion is inescapable that a
great deal of the solution is tied up in government policy, not only as
expressed in legislation, but in the collective mental attitude of the
men comprising government.
It is, therefore, suggested that the following revisions of
government policy wo\ild lead to greater availability of the risk capital
that government itself agrees is necessary for economic health (E).
1. The need for tax revision has been bro\jght out as
necessary to a greater flow of risk capital; the chief
obstacle to constructive action appears to be the high
tide of government spending. Were the government to
postpone public works until a future period of recession
(when private expenditures might not be sufficient to
maintain employment) not only would scarce supplies
and labor be made available to productive enterprise,
but taxes could be made less of a confiscatory nature,
resulting in more savings being made available for
equity investment.
(1) The Securities Acts were a considerable force for eliminating fraud
and securing higher accounting standards together mth wider dis-
semination of information. The F. T. C, N. R. A., and undistributed
profits tax contributed to the creation of monopoly and legalized
price fixing ostensibly to protect small business.
(S) President Truman in 1947 estimated fifty billions in new capital to
be necessary.
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2. Margin requironents have been continued at a 75 per
cent level due to (it is claimed) J'ederal Reserve
fear of gambling in the securities market. The drastic
margin requirements and other credit restrictions are
considered to be behind the larggard performance of
the stock market throughout a time of inflationary-
tendencies and high corporate earnings (l). Yet banks
are allowed to give corporations substantial short term
credits for plant expansion. Why not allow banks to
make loans to responsible stock investors so that com-
panies can expand facilities vdthout fear of a debt-heavy
capital structure? At present, stock prices at only five-
six times the earning power of leading coiT)orations means
that in order to realize the required amount of inflated
dollars, a large amount of stock must be sold. Corpora-
tions will thus find themselves in a greatly over extended
position in any future correction when stocks will be even
more abimdant; the possibility of a crash on an even
greater scale then in 1929 is apparent (2).
Xl) Security loans in reporting member banks totaled about 6.9 billion in
1948 and 7.5 billion in 1929. In July, 1948, the loans on securities
(other than government bonds) amounted to but 0.94 billion in a
larger number of reporting member banks.
(2) Witherspoon, William, Margin and Credit Restrictions, ComiieriGal
Financial Chronicle. Vol. 168, Thursday, July 15, 1948, Page 3.
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It woiild seem that the possibilities of overextended
coirporate structures and excessive debt outweigh the
danger of stock market speculation, should margin
requirements be dropped to 50 per cent or lower.
However, lower margin requirements are recommended ivith
the feeling that any tendency to excess will be curbed
by the banks themselves whose e35)erience vdth the
excesses of the 1928, 1929 era may be coxinted on for
caution handling of stock loans.
3. Govemtaent persistence in social legislation and the
growing tendency of the individual to look to government
to solve his problems has been referred to as discouraging
risk-taking on the part of those individuals. The "welfare
state" program obviously present many dangers to the flow
of risk capital. The desire for security and stability
may lead to government attempting to prevent a desirable
correction in business conditions and trying to hold the
economy at the inflationary peak reached in 1948, by
increasing public expenditures financed by higher taxes
which will still further restrict the flow of fresh capital
into the tools and equipment which provide new jobs and
increase production.
Where security is guaranteed, there is no incentive to save
and invest, and "free riders" are only too willing to
benefit at the expense of the productive members of the nation.
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"But there is a point beyond -which the majority would lack
the incentive to provide for the drones. When a
situation would be created whereby production wo\ild
slacken, and there would be less and less to share until
all would be on a subsistence level. Eventually, the
Utopian scheme would be swallowed up in some form of
totalitarianism." (l)
Thus, the basic policy that government should revise is its
tendency to put the emphasis on welfare aids rather than
maintaining an atmosphere conducive to business and investor
confidence. Adequate regards for risk taking result in a
flow of funds into new capital equipment which is the only
source of a higher standard of living, and high employment.
The only policy which will truly benefit all individuals is
one which rewards energy and econony and encourages business
to make long-term commitments.
"In plotting our course for the future, we should be mindful
that the advance of civilization is the record of man's
struggle in overcoming the forces of nature by hard work
and constantly searching for better ways of doing things,
and not by leaning on government crutches."
4. Coupled with the attempt to secure the "welfare" of the
people, government has pursued the policy of perpetuating the
Wall Street myth and attacking the profits of business as
excessive. Such an attitude on the part of government cannot
help but conceal the vital functions performed in the economy
by the stock market and cause many, who—xvith the leveling
(T) "What price 'Welfare State?*", Nev/ England Letter . First National
Bank of Boston, Januaiy, 1949.
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of weal til—are now able to contribute to the supply
of ventiu*e capital, to be reluctant to invest.
Furtheimore, such a policy of pointing to a large dollar
profit as excessive without considering other factors such
as return on investment, increased cost of doing the same
volme of business, and the high cost of new equipment
leads not only to loss of confidence in business by the
public, but loss of confidence in government by the
individuals who are accustomed to save and invest.
Considerable risk is involved in the vestment of equity
funds. An aviation stock which sold at 79 in 1946 now is
listed at 9. Ninety out of every hundred frozen foods
companies doing business in 1946 have failed. An investor
contemplating the economic risks involved in a given
investment is not encouraged by the hostility of govern-
ment whether expressed in the tax laws or by the utterances
of government spokesmen*
On all sides, the effective operation of industry is being
hampered by restrictive rxiles and regulations and the
threat of additional rules and regulations is constantly
undermining the incentive to eacpand and produce. This
policy plays into the hands of those whose program is
the eventual socialization of all industry. Eventually,
the people will decide the course this country is to
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follow, basing their decision on the infomation
available to them. The fallacious arguments of left-
wing planners have a much better chance of acceptance,
if government continually "sells" the idea that high
profits are bad and are achieved only thro-ugh "gouging
the public".
D. Broaden Common Stock Ownership
Since the advent of the New Deal, the middle and lower classes
have received a greater share of the national income due to the tai
structure, union activity, and other factors. The historical source of
eq[uity funds—the upper income brackets—have virtually been closed off by
the high personal income taxes. An important prospective sovirce, the life
insurance industry, is virtually prohibited by law from such investment.
Logically then the middle and lower classes, who have always regarded
stock ownership with suspicion, must be sold on the advantages of such
ownership, or business topheavy with debt will eventually go bankrupt or
receive equity funds from the only remaining source—the government.
Statistics of income exained for the years 1928 and 1942 afford
the following information, showing the redistribution of income.

Conclusion
Table IX
Individual Returns and Taxable Fiduciary Returns
With Net Income by Net Income Classes 19E8 and 1942
(Thousands of Dollars)
Net Income Classes
Individual Returns and Taxable
Fiduciary Returns with Net Income
Under 3, Form 104-A, not distributed
Under 1
1 Under 2
2 Under 3
3 Under 5
5 Under 10
10 Under 25
25 Under 50
50 Under 100
100 Under 150
150 Under 300
300 Under 500
500 Under 1,000
1,000 and over
1928
Number of Returns
1942
I 111,123
918,447
837,781
1,192,613
628,766
270,889
68,048
27,207
7,049
5,678
1,756
983
511
16,106,039
3,228,706
7,172,627
5,430,790
3,422,331
785,785
300,161
65,137
19,795
3,585
1,985
415
199
90
Source: Statistics of Income for 1942, United States Treasury Department,
BureauTof Internal Revenue, Washington, D. C, Part 1, Pages 234,
235.
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WMle the population increment and lower exemptions swell the
number of individual reporting income in the lower braclcets, there is a
marked reduction in the nimher of incomes beginning with the "25 \mder 50"
bracket. In addition, stock market statistics show that over 85 per cent
of the individuals holding stocks of January 1, 1948, held the save invest-
ments one year later. Those who are charged with selling equity securities
consequently must redirect their selling efforts to the people who now have
the fmds for investment.
Statistics indicate that the middle and lower classes now have
two main outlets for their savings—insurance, due to the excellent selling
efforts of the insurance companies, and gambling, due to the urge to take
a change not yet bred out of the American people. Insurance assets
reached 52 billions in 1948, more than double the 1939 figure, and are
growing at the rate of 3.5 billions a year. Horserace betting alone in
tv/enty-one states, according to a United Press survey, amounted to 3.3
billions in 1947 and 1948.
A McGraw-Hill economist, Dexter Keezer, is reported (l) to have
coined the phrase "?Jhat this country needs is a $2. 00 window vvhere the public
can place their bets on the future of American Industry." The population
is earning and saving as never before, yet unprecedented opportunities to
buy great values at bargain prices in the stock exchange are ignored. This
condition wherein quoted prices are so much lower than the recognized values
JT] Badger, Shervan C, Needed a $2.00 Window for Bets on Industry, Boston
Globe, Siinday, January 30, 1949, Page 32.
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of many stocks has resulted in many corporations preferring to incur large
amounts of debt at low interest rates, rather than sell their stocks at
prices which represent very substantial discounts from their liquidating
values.
A newspaper article (l) analyzes the successful flotation of
627,960 shares of Bethlehem Steel common stock in January, 1949. Those who
hold it is perfectly possible to sell new common stock issues if the issuing
corporation is realistic about the price will point to the Bethlehem case
as evidence. But analysis of the sales prices discloses that these new
stockholders were allowed to buy into the company at a price which values
the company's 14, 200, 000-ton steel capacity at $20.50 per ton.
The generally accepted cost of building steel capacity at 1949
prices is $250 per ton. In other words, anyone who had $20.50 available
coiild buy into a going and highly successful corporation at less than one-
twelfth of the cost of starting a nev; steel company. Considering other
aspects, the Bethlehon Company conservatively values its common stock at a
tangible value of $56.00 a share or 72 per cent in excess of the selling price
of the new stock. And the basis of this valuation is cost, mostly in terms
of pre-1948 dollars, less accrued depreciation. In addition, Bethlehem
profits are at an annual rate of better than 16 per cent on the stock at
present prices. The annual dividend return is 7.7 per cent. Both percen-
tages would seem to warrant much better prices for Betlilehem common stocks.
Neverthless, many corporations of the country are selling in
JT] Badger, Sherwin C, Needed - a $2.00 V/indow for Bets on Industry, Boston
Globe
.
Sunday, January 30, 1949, Page 32.
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todays markets at less than their net current assets, their plants,
experience, and credit standing; valued at zero or less. Many industrial
stocks are selling for less than the new money "poured" back into the bus-
iness during the postv.'E.r expansion.
The great danger to the economy lies in the inability of companies
to borrow indefinitely. The McGraw-Hill survey showed that while only 9 per
cent of 300 leading corporations planned to sell additional stock, 20 per
cent woiild like to, except that they camiot afford to give new stockholders
something for nothing. Industry, then, unable to finance expansion and
development in borroTJing alone is either going to have to reduce business
volume or take the risk of entering a business recession top-heavy vdth
long and short term debt. A recession could vj-ell force some companies to
sell assets at a loss and others into bankruptcy, possibly on a scale large
enough to turn a business correction into a severe depression.
The lower income groups have a great stake in the future of the
American corporation. Throughout American histor^s business prosperity has
meant prosperity for individuals. Anything which threatens bad times for
industry, threatens bad times for the individual wage earner. This alone
should give the former lower income classes, the labor groups, and business
groups incentive to study the situation.
On the other hand, a concentrated selling effort by the security
salesmen is necessary to bring the new market to an understandii]g of the
situation. The spokesmen for the Investment Bankers Association appear to
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imderstand this (l). The retiring president of the I. B. A. stated that
the new market could be opened:
"By introducing improved methods of business solicitation
which are designed to reach the thousands of individuals v/ho
hold the unprecedented amounts of liquid assets." (2)
He recognizes that these prospects may be found:
"In agricultural communities a somewhere off the main road
of our cities and toims, unaccustomed to investment
responsibilities." ( 5)
The incoming President of the I. B. A. approved this vievj-
stating:
"To put it bluntly, we need more doorbell ringers and fewer
order takers." (4)
One investment banker ( 5) advocates that the ownership of common
stocks could be popularized by an appeal of influential persons to organi-
zations such as the United States Chamber of Commerce and the different
Chambers of Comi^erce throughout the country, the ABA, the NAM, the National
Association of Insurance Companies, as well as the C. I. 0., ejid the A. T.
of L. These organizations should establish corririiittees to encourarie their
membership to ovm the common stock of corporations since the welfare of
IT) ^ow to Get Risk Capital?", Business Week, No. 1007, December IS, 1948,
Pages 90-92.
W IbidT
JW IbidT
jn Ibid.
(5) Harvey, J. Allen, Broader Comnon Stock Ovmership, Foe of Socialism
and Comriunisiri., Comnercial and financial Chronicle
.
Vol. 168, Thursday,
October 14, 1948, Page 16.
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their manbership depends on the continvance and operation of the corporate
form of economy.
A broadened common stock ownership could result not only in an
influx of badly needed equity capital which iTOuld continue business expan-
sion on a sound basis, but in a "people' s capitalism" v/hich would strengthen
the economy and end cheap, political attacks on "?Jall Street". In addition,
much more effective resistance to socialization of industry is possible v/hen
the ownership of industry is Tddespread.
The secxirity salesman has the opportunity today to sell the new
market a high grade security at relatively lov/ prices. It is up to him to
educate the nev/ owners of capital fmids and to make stock investment as easy
as purchasing insurance. For example, investment trust are today selling
stocks on the installment plan. If he does not succeed in opening the so-
called "^2.00 windoiv", the day vdll eventually come vrhen jobs vail be scarce
because the money to finance them is unavailable.
Should G-overnmcnt Provide Equity Funds
—
DaEg er of
Subsidization _and State Sociali sm
Proposals have been advanced from time to time that the government
supply risk capital either directly or through quasi-governmental agencies.
With the elimination of the upper income group as a source of capital, and
the reluctance or inability of other groups in the economy to replace that
source, this proposition mil undoubtedly be advanced T\lth more insistence
in the event of a business recession. The point has been made throughout
this thesis, that in the midst of prosperity, the greatest "boom" in
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American history, the public markets are unable to supply risk capital to
business earning at aa all-time high. A depression which threatened dis-
aster for business overladen mth debt and brought vddespread unemployment
would find industry as well as individuals turning to Washington for help
in the form of an RFC providing risk capital.
The effect of depression on govenmiental x^dllingness to enter new
fields of activity is well shovm by the participation of government in
private backing activities in the middle thirties. One textbook (l) divides
the goverament lending agencies created in that era into four groups—invest-
ment banking including the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, commercial
banking, includin;? the Commodity Credit Corporation, Co-operative and con-
sumer credit including the Tennessee Vallej'- Associated Co-operatives, Inc.,
and a miscellaneous group v/hich includes the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation. A partial list of these agencies numbers thirty- t-;vo. Through
such agencies, the government loaned more than ten billion dollars in less
than three years. A most significant point in connection v.lth government
entry into the banking field is the difficulty of vathdrawal once entry has
been effected. The govemm.ent agencies considered above xvere presumably
created to meet an emergency; not only are they still active, but their
development has continued as that even if government v/ere to desire retire-
ment from the field, liquidation of all the agencies involved would take
many years. In addition, political, factors ?70uld make such retirement very
(T5 Bogen, Foster, Nadler, and Rodgers, Money end Banking , Prentice-Hall,
Inc., Nev; York, 1947, Pages 106-107.
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difficult of achi eveanent
.
Through the Reconstruction finance Corporation, the government
is in a position to finance enterprises which may or may not have been able
to obtain the necessary funds else^rhere and to direct private capital into
such enterprises assuming part of the risk. The Federal Reserve Banks
are peimitted to make industrial advance under certain conditions by a
1934 act of Congress. Eoi'/ever, since these goverrment agencies can only
finance by loans, they are creditors, not oviners of those companies who
require government aid.
The need is fo?' equitj^ capital; v-fhy shoul.d not government finemce
industry by authorizing agencies to purchase the cominon stocks of industry
in addition to its bonds? During the vjar, the government supplied an
enormous amount of what constituted risk capital, through The Defense Plants
Corporation which built plants and bought machinery, and then leased these
facilities to the operating companies. The government corporation acted
as a banker in this instance. Subject to some supervision, the operation
companies designed and built the plants they operated. At its peak, the
government vjas estimated to ovm one-third of industry. This device created
to meet the war emei^ency could conceivably be used to bolster industry
during a depression.
There are however basic objections to government advancing equity
capital to business. First, the sale of equity seciirities to a government
or quasi-governmental agency involves more risk than a government lending
agency should assume in time of peace. This is parti ciilarlj?' true at a time
when the government debt is in excess of 250 billions. Secondly, the
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ability of the governmental agency to vasely use the funds made available
to it and to discern those equitj'- investments which are best for the economy
may seriously be questioned. The economy could probably not stand the strain
of the profligate spending of funds as v/as true in the thirties.
The prime objection, of course, is the prospect of state subsidy
and control of businesses financed in this way. Subsidies vrould dull the
incentive for these businesses to cut costs and become efficient; they
vrauld prevent the removal of inefficient producers from the field, and dis-
courage the competitive feature of our economy which has directly resulted
in the consumer receiving a better product for less money.
In totalitarian countries, government owned agencies such as
banks and corporations which purchased equitjr securities eventually acquired
full control over the businesses financed. A repetition of the situation in
the United States could easily have the same res\ilt. Equitjr financing by
government agency could easily/- lee.d to "State socialism by indirection", (l)
The dangers of such action are obvious and make clear that a private enter-
prise syston must obtain venture capital from private agencies if it is to
sxirvice.
The 1945 progress report on the Special Committee to Study Problems
of American Small Business of the United States Senate contained the follovj--
ing statement:
"The committee has considered certain legislation proposals
and held extensive hearings on this risk-capital problem.
(1) Bog en, Jules I., The Market for Risk Capital , American Enterprise
Association, August, 1946, Page 27.
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These proposals all authorize the use of goTerment funds
to finance, by direct outlay or hy guarantee, or insurance,
new investments of various kinds. The conraittee does not
as yet sponsor aiiy proposal."
"The conmiittee is favorably inclined, however, toward the
encouragement of investment pools in a local scale setup
to operate mthout discrimination under carefully thought-
out conditions that iivoiild achieve the utmost possible free
enterprise."
After considering the problem carefully and analyzing several
alternatives, it appears that goverment eouity financing xTOuld imperil the
free enterprise system. The cure might easily be -vrorse than the disease.
Many highly qualified businessmen and economists feel that other action
mthin the power of government and suggested in the foregoing paragraphs
would assure an adequate supply of risk capital. Let government ease taxes
and depreciation rates, ellovt insurance companies to take equities, revise
its anti-business policies, ease margin requirements, and encourage a
broader holding of comraon stock by the iimerican people.
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